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INTRODUCTION 
A professional sports organization’s relationship with its players and 
potential players is, at base, an employer’s relationship with its employees 
and, like other employer-employee relationships, is regulated under state 
and federal law.1 As such, an organization’s approach to fielding a team 
must comply with, among other mandates, the provisions of Title VII of 
1. See Alison M. Barnes, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Aging Athlete After
Casey Martin, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 67, 84 (2001) (explaining that sports teams are generally 
“employers of their athletes” and thus subject to the Americans with Disabilities Act); Stephen 
Cormac Carlin & Christopher M. Fairman, Squeeze Play: Workers’ Compensation and the 
Professional Athlete, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 95, 104–05 (1994–1995) (articulating the 
presumption that “professional athletes are included under state workers’ compensation plans”); 
Teresa Herbert, Are Player Injuries Adequately Compensated?, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 243, 245, 263 
(2000) (describing professional sports teams as employers and their athletes as employees and 
exploring the consequent applicability of workers’ compensation statutes in the professional sports 
context); Steven I. Rubin, The Vicarious Liability of Professional Sports Teams for On-the-Field 
Assaults Committed by Their Players, 1 VA. J. SPORTS & L. 266, 268 (1999) (identifying the 
relationship between a professional sports franchise and its players as one between employer and 
employee and exploring the doctrine of respondeat superior in the professional sports context); 
Deanne L. Ayers, Comment, Random Urinalysis: Violating the Athlete’s Individual Rights?, 30 HOW. 
L.J. 93, 126 (1987) (explaining that “owners of professional sports teams are private employers
engaged in a business enterprise” and examining the privacy implications of subjecting players to
random drug testing).
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) prohibiting racial discrimination 
in employment.2  
Although professional sports organizations’ acquisitions and 
terminations are regularly detailed in newspapers across the country, the 
high-profile and generally highly remunerated nature of professional 
athletic employment makes it no less regulated under Title VII than 
actions to which the statute might more intuitively apply. Indeed, the law 
offers no distinction between the half-billion-dollar sports franchise to 
which millions of fans are devoted and the modest, fifteen-employee, 
convenience store of which only a few hundred patrons are aware.3 Both 
organizations must comply with Title VII. Notwithstanding Title VII’s 
directives, however, professional sports organizations’ consideration of 
race in crafting their rosters has long impacted American professional 
sport, just as racial discrimination in other industries has long impacted the 
American workplace more broadly.4 
The consequences of employment discrimination—whether a 
professional sports organization’s race-considered roster construction or a 
non-sports-related employer’s discriminatory hiring practices—can be 
several and severe.5 Professional sports organizations are, however, 
2. See Michael Corey Dawson, Comment, A Change Must Come: All Racial Barriers
Precluding Minority Representation in Managerial Positions on Professional Sports Teams Must be 
Eliminated, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 551, 556 (1999). In pertinent part, § 703 of Title VII states: 
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or  
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). The provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000), which prohibit racial 
discrimination in contract creation and enforcement, see Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Race Realism: Re-
Claiming the Antidiscrimination Principle Through the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 66 
U. PITT. L. REV. 455, 487 (2005), would also apply to a professional sports organization’s employment
decisions. Although § 1981 and Title VII are procedurally distinct, § 1981 jurisprudence has largely
adopted the methods of proof applied in Title VII intentional discrimination challenges and the two
statutes are, therefore, often applied in tandem. See id. at 487–88.
3. Employers with fewer than fifteen employees are not subject to liability under Title VII. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). 
4. See infra Part II. 
5. See Recent Cases, Title VII—Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense—Necessity of
Sex Discriminatory Policy Should Be Evaluated According to a Totality of the Circumstances Test— 
Torres v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, 859 F.2d 1522 (7th Cir. 1988), 102 
HARV. L. REV. 2048, 2053 n.42 (1989) (“minority employment discrimination” results in “vast social 
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unique among employers. Unlike other employers, professional sports 
organizations have fans—avid supporters with no official organizational 
affiliation—who follow and celebrate the organizations’ competitive 
exploits.6 Fans pay large sums of money to watch these organizations 
compete, adorn their cars, homes, and offices with the organizations’ 
emblems, and dress in the organizations’ colors. In short, they identify 
with the organizations.7  
This unique organizational context creates the possibility of unique 
employment discrimination consequences. To the extent that a 
professional sports organization engages in discriminatory employment 
practices and creates a racially imbalanced or homogeneous team, it risks 
fans’ identification not only with that team, but also with the team’s racial 
imbalance or homogeneity. And because of the zealous support sport 
fanmanship engenders, it risks the possibility that fans’ support of team in 
competition devolves into fans’ support of race in competition, 
perpetuating racial division and attendant socially detrimental racially 
motivated animosity.  
Considering the unique character of employment discrimination in the 
race-considered roster construction context, it is necessary to explore the 
dangers specific to employment discrimination in that context, the import 
and nature of Title VII scrutiny of such employment discrimination, the 
extent to which some instances of race-considered roster construction 
might pass Title VII muster, and whether Title VII inapplicability in those 
instances results in societal detriment. This Article seeks to do so.  
Part I examines Title VII, its history, and the prospect of its application 
in the race-considered roster construction context. Part II engages the 
phenomenon of race-considered roster construction and explores its 
persistence in the post-civil rights era, primarily through historical 
examination of Major League Baseball’s Boston Red Sox and the National 
Basketball Association’s Boston Celtics, two professional sports 
organizations for years associated with racially imbalanced rosters. This 
part also explores the consequences unique to employment discrimination 
in the race-considered roster construction context. Part III examines the 
applicability of Title VII doctrine to race-considered roster construction, 
exploring the factors involved in establishing liability as well as the means 
consequences . . . afflict[ing] the whole of the nation”) (quoting Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail 
Deliverers’ Union, 384 F. Supp 585, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)). 
6. See Debra A. Laverie & Dennis B. Arnett, Factors Affecting Fan Attendance: The Influence
of Identity Salience and Satisfaction, 32 J. LEISURE RES. 225 (2000). 
7. See id.
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by which a professional sports organization might seek to defend against a 
Title VII action. Part IV explores race-considered roster construction 
favoring non-white players, rather than white players, through examining 
the construction of the 2005 New York Mets. This part analyzes the extent 
to which Title VII applies differently to such roster construction, the role 
of affirmative action in that application, and whether such roster 
construction, even if deemed lawful, risks generating the negative societal 
consequences traditionally associated with race-considered roster 
construction favoring white players. Finally, Part V encourages sustained 
Title VII scrutiny of professional sports organizations’ personnel decisions 
to reduce the incidence of unlawful race-considered roster construction 
and, thus, eliminate the negative societal consequences it breeds.  
I. TITLE VII AS A TOOL AGAINST RACE-CONSIDERED ROSTER
CONSTRUCTION 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“1964 Act” or “Act”), passed in the 
midst of significant societal discord and violence and with an aim toward 
diffusing it, is widely recognized as the most significant civil rights 
legislation enacted in our nation’s history.8 Congress passed the Act “to 
implement our national commitment to equality,” and in doing so 
instituted change across a wide swath of law,9 resulting in its reputation as 
“‘the most far-reaching bill on civil rights in modern’ American history.”10 
All told, the Act has eleven titles11 outlawing discrimination in realms of 
American life from voter registration to public accommodations access.12  
Such wide-ranging change is not quietly catalyzed, and the factors 
resulting in the Act’s passage reveal the Act was certainly no exception. 
Indeed, as noted above, the Act was born of tumultuous violence.13 When 
the United States abolished chattel slavery, those formerly enslaved did 
not experience freedom in any meaningful sense.14 Rather, their 
8. See Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere & Phillip C. Aka, Title VII, Affirmative Action, and the
March Toward Color-Blind Jurisprudence, 11 TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 14–21 (2001). 
9. Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the
Disparate Impact Theory of Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 432 (2005). 
10. Iheukwumere & Aka, supra note 8, at 14 (quoting STEFFEN W. SCHMIDT ET AL., AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS TODAY 164 (2001–2002 ed.) (2001)).  
11. Belton, supra note 9, at 432. 
12. See SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 10, at 164. 
13. See Iheukwumere & Aka, supra note 8, at 21.
14. See Robert Pettus Hay, Writing History: Time and the Story of Slavery, 52 MISS. Q. 329, 330
(1999). 
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oppression merely shifted gears.15 Although no longer property, the former 
slave population remained socially, economically, and politically 
subjugated as the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth and the 
twentieth marched toward its latter half.16 Black Americans, and others 
sympathetic to their plight, agitated for change throughout that period, but 
agitation increased in scope in the 1950s and early 1960s resulting in 
substantial social unrest.17 While this movement for equality, known 
popularly as the Civil Rights Movement, was largely peaceful,18 responses 
to it were often violent and murderous.19 “Although killings, beatings, and 
torture of the civil rights activists were well known to those intimately 
involved in the movement,”20 much of America, lawmakers and residents 
alike, turned a blind eye to the violence.21  
When the violence became impossible to ignore, however, a federal 
legislative response began taking shape.22 Having observed the wide-
spread violence as well as the courageous stand of the civil rights 
community against it, then-Attorney General Robert Kennedy developed a 
keen interest in addressing the problem,23 which became for Kennedy, in 
1961, quite personal.24 In that year, while in Alabama, the Attorney 
General’s administrative assistant was set upon by a mob of club-wielding 
whites, knocked unconscious, and left lying on the sidewalk for thirty 
minutes before help was summoned.25 This personal connection to the 
racial violence of the day intensified Kennedy’s dedication to the problem, 
and, on May 17, 1963, during a flight from Washington, D.C., to North 
Carolina, he began, with an aide, to craft the bill that would eventually 
become the 1964 Act.26 
Attorney General Kennedy’s brother, President John F. Kennedy, was 
far more hesitant to engage the issue.27 Eventually, however, he too 
recognized the nation’s need for comprehensive civil rights legislation and 
15. See id. 
16. See id. 
17. See Phyliss Craig-Taylor, To Be Free: Liberty, Citizenship, Property, and Race, 14 HARV.
BLACKLETTER L.J. 45, 64–65 (1998). 
18. See Sally Avery Bermanzohn, Violence, Nonviolence, and the Civil Rights Movement, 22
NEW POL. SCI. 31, 41–48 (2000).  
19. See id. at 31. 
20. Iheukwumere & Aka, supra note 8, at 21. 
21. See Bermanzohn, supra note 18, at 34. 
22. See id. at 32–33. 
23. See CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE 5 (1985). 
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
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was likely spurred to action after witnessing national television footage of 
a brutal response to a peaceful civil rights demonstration in Birmingham, 
Alabama, during which the Alabama Police Commissioner ordered 
officers to attack the demonstrators—adults and children alike—with 
police dogs and cattle prods.28 If, indeed, the violent footage motivated 
President Kennedy’s attention to the issue, he was not alone. The televised 
Alabama attacks, perhaps more than any other individual occurrence, 
“convinced a substantial majority of the public that action was needed to 
ameliorate the injustices against their fellow citizens.”29 The violence 
became, to the majority of the nation, intolerable, and congressional action 
was deemed necessary to establish equality under the law for all 
Americans in order that America’s long-standing racial wound heal.30  
On June 26, 1963, President Kennedy presented to Congress the first 
iteration of the 1964 Act,31 and fundamental to that first iteration was 
equal employment opportunity.32 Although the proposed legislation would 
endure significant filibuster, debate, and amendment before President 
Lyndon Johnson signed it into law on July 2, 1964,33 equal employment 
opportunity remained a central theme of the legislation, embedded firmly 
in the seventh of the Act’s many Titles.34 In spite of the many amendments 
that have impacted the 1964 Act since its passage, Title VII remains 
integral to this nation’s civil rights protections.35 Indeed, of all the Act’s 
titles, “Title VII has emerged as having the most significant impact in 
helping to shape the legal and policy discourse on the meaning of 
equality.”36  
Title VII reads, in relevant part, “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
. . . .”37 This prohibition on employment discrimination governs all 
employers, whether private or public, with fifteen or more employees,38 
28. See Iheukwumere & Aka, supra note 8, at 21 n.134. 
29. Id. at 21 n.134. 
30. See id. 
31. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 23, at 2–3. 
32. See id. at 1–2. 
33. Id. at 228. 
34. See id. at 115–19. 
35. See Belton, supra note 9, at 432–33. 
36. Id. 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
38. § 2000e(b).
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and therefore, governs all American professional sports organizations.39 
And, in that a desire to quell racial violence spurred Title VII’s passage, its 
application in thwarting race-considered roster construction, race-based 
team identification, and the potential violence that flows therefrom, would 
certainly seem appropriate. 
II. RACE-CONSIDERED ROSTER CONSTRUCTION:
THE PHENOMENON; THE CONSEQUENCES
Each of America’s major professional sports leagues—the National 
Basketball Association (NBA), the National Hockey League (NHL), the 
National Football League (NFL), and Major League Baseball (MLB or the 
“Major Leagues”)—has its own unique history with race and racial 
discrimination.40 The NBA included its first black player in 1950, with the 
Boston Celtics drafting Chuck Cooper of Duquesne University.41 The 
NHL integrated several years later when the Boston Bruins debuted Willie 
O’Ree.42 The NFL, founded in 1920 and originally operating as the 
39. Professor Kenneth Shropshire incisively notes that, to the extent a private professional sports
organization takes on a public character through playing in a government-owned arena, the 
organization’s hiring practices could be deemed state action and the organization could face liability 
under another of the 1964 Act’s titles, Title II, which prohibits discrimination in places of public 
accommodation. See KENNETH SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND SPORTS IN AMERICA 
73 (1996). Although the majority of professional sports organizations utilize state-owned arenas, 
Professor Shropshire explains this legal approach would involve courts “sifting facts and weighing 
circumstances” to determine whether “the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct” 
constitutes state action in a particular case, and would face difficulty in successfully establishing 
liability. Id. (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).  
40. In addressing the integration of America’s four major sports leagues, the author focuses on
the acceptance of black players into the respective leagues. The author does so reluctantly and with 
awareness of the limits and dangers of a bi-polar discussion of race in a country that is multi-racial 
rather than bi-racial. The initial acceptance of blacks into the respective leagues, however, carries 
particular importance because, as Professor Shropshire explains, “the history of [discrimination in] 
sports . . . sets it apart from any other institution in America,” in that black athletes (particularly black 
baseball players) often tried to pass as members of other races—for instance, “Native Americans or 
[light-skinned] Latinos”—because such athletes were more readily accepted on the field of play. 
SHROPSHIRE, supra note 39, at xxii. Notably, although light-skinned Latinos were permitted to play 
major league baseball before blacks, for example, they often suffered discriminatorily low pay and 
were degradingly stereotyped. See Timothy Davis, Racism in Athletics: Subtle Yet Persistent, 21 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 881, 890–91 (1999).  
41. See HARVEY ARATON & FILIP BONDY, THE SELLING OF THE GREEN: THE FINANCIAL RISE 
AND MORAL DECLINE OF THE BOSTON CELTICS 50–51 (1992); HOWARD BRYANT, SHUT OUT: A 
STORY OF RACE AND BASEBALL IN BOSTON 143 (2002). During that same season, the Washington 
Capitols added Earl Lloyd and the New York Knicks signed Nat “Sweetwater” Clifton. See 
SHROPSHIRE, supra note 39, at 31. Lloyd, although drafted after Cooper, was the first black player to 
actually enter an NBA game. Id.  
42. See PATRICK CLARK, SPORTS FIRSTS 69 (1981). 
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American Professional Football Association,43 did not initially restrict 
black athletes from playing in the league.44 In 1934, however, the NFL’s 
teams changed course, expurgating all black players.45 Twelve years later, 
the NFL re-integrated, with the Los Angeles Rams signing Kenny 
Washington and Woody Strode in 1946.46 Major League Baseball, 
comprised of two separate leagues, the American League and National 
League, and working under a joint organizational structure originally 
instituted in 1903,47 has perhaps the most notorious experience with racial 
exclusion and eventual inclusion. While the two leagues permitted black 
players in the late 1800s, some entirely white teams refused to play against 
teams with black players and black players were ushered out of the 
leagues, ultimately organizing to play among themselves.48 In 1920, the 
Negro National League, the first of several leagues of black baseball 
teams, which would together be known as the Negro Leagues, began 
play.49 The Negro Leagues were unique on the American athletic 
landscape, providing successful alternative outlets for black baseball 
players to display their talents.50 For decades, whites and blacks played 
baseball on parallel tracks in entirely separate leagues, meeting only 
occasionally in exhibition matches.51  
As the second half of the twentieth century approached, however, MLB 
teams would slowly open their doors to black players, beginning with the 
Brooklyn Dodgers’ 1947 decision to field former Negro Leaguer Jackie 
Robinson at second base.52 Rather than resolutely smashing the 
discriminatory barrier to professional sport as is often romantically 
portrayed,53 the Dodgers’ decision to field Robinson created in the barrier 
43. Id. at 37. During the following year, the American Professional Football Association
reorganized and changed its name to the American Professional Football League. Id. 
44. See ARTHUR R. ASHE, JR., A HARD ROAD TO GLORY: A HISTORY OF THE AFRICAN-
AMERICAN ATHLETE SINCE 1946 130 (1988). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. See THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA: THE COMPLETE AND DEFINITIVE RECORD OF MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL 6 (Jeanine Bucek ed., 1996). 
48. See CLARK, supra note 42, at 12. 
49. See ARTHUR R. ASHE, JR., A HARD ROAD TO GLORY: A HISTORY OF THE AFRICAN-
AMERICAN ATHLETE 1919–1945 27–30 (1988); SHROPSHIRE, supra note 39, at 47. 
50. See ASHE, supra note 49, at 27–30; SHROPSHIRE, supra note 39, at 46–47. 
51. See ASHE, supra note 49, at 27–36. 
52. See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 39, at 29.
53. Notably, the NFL actually integrated before MLB. See supra text accompanying notes 46,
52. Despite the NFL’s integration a year earlier, however, “[w]hen Jackie Robinson integrated Major
League Baseball in 1947, that event was hailed as the biggest civil rights success since the Civil War.”
SHROPSHIRE, supra note 39, at 19. Perhaps in part because professional baseball was at the time far
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a thin breach, to which only a few black players would initially gain 
access.54 As decades rolled by, the opening widened and professional 
baseball, as well as American professional sport more broadly, grew in 
diversity.55 Different teams, however, embraced equal employment 
opportunity for players to different extents, with some lagging well behind 
others in the signing of black players. No team in any league is reputed as 
having been more resistant than the Boston Red Sox.56  
A. Race and the Red Sox
The Red Sox’s reputation was born, ironically, when the club, on April
16, 1945, invited Jackie Robinson and two other talented Negro League 
players, Sam Jethroe and Marvin Williams, to its home field, Fenway 
Park, for a tryout.57 Not until the tryout commenced did the players realize 
the audition was a sham, resulting from a political compromise, and that 
the Red Sox had no interest in employing any of the three.58 The Red 
Sox’s preference for fielding a team entirely of white players was not at all 
aberrant at the time. As other organizations began to employ black players, 
however, the Red Sox remained entrenched—so much so that in 1949, 
they declined to hire a young and already supremely talented Willie Mays, 
who would go on to become arguably the best player in the history of 
baseball.59 Indeed, after each of MLB’s other fifteen clubs had opted to 
integrate their teams, the Red Sox held out, until finally adding a black 
player in 1959.60 The Red Sox’s discrimination in hiring to that point was 
clearly intentional and widely viewed as the consequence of racial animus 
more popular in America than professional football, see ASHE, supra note 44, at 128, Jackie 
Robinson’s MLB debut was then, and continues to be, viewed as the more significant milestone.  
54. See ASHE, supra note 44, at 5, providing as follows: 
The period from Jackie Robinson’s debut in April 1947 to 1953 can best be described as one
of token integration. In this seven-year stretch, the National League added blacks at the rate
of three every two years; the American League just one every two years. Some clubs would
just not add any. . . . It took fourteen years for the major leagues to become integrated. 
See also BRYANT, supra note 41, at 63. Career MLB home run record holder, Hank Aaron, articulated 
a view widely shared among black players during the early days of baseball integration that although 
the Major Leagues were officially integrated, “the white baseball establishment would only make 
room for exceptional black players.” Id.  
55. See ASHE, supra note 44, at 5. 
56. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 1–2. 
57. Id. at 31. 
58. Id. at 32.
59. See id. at 45–46; Steve Fainaru, In Racism’s Shadow: Red Sox Working to Shed Longtime
Image, but Blacks In and Out of Baseball Still Uneasy, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1991, at 1. 
60. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 53. 
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in Red Sox management.61 However, the discrimination predated, and was 
thus not actionable under, Title VII.62 For several years following Title 
VII’s 1964 enactment, the Red Sox fielded relatively racially balanced 
teams,63 but the team’s roster soon fell back into conspicuous racial 
imbalance.64 In the years following the widespread eruptive opposition to 
Boston’s 1974 implementation of an integrationist busing program for 
public school children, the Red Sox’s percentage of black players steadily 
declined.65 By 1979, the Red Sox had only one black player, All-Star 
outfielder Jim Rice, who would remain the only black player on the team 
for roughly four seasons.66 The imbalance continued through the 1980s, 
during which decade the Red Sox fielded fewer black players than any 
other Major League Baseball organization, and by decade’s end “racism 
and the Red Sox were inseparable topics.”67  
The Red Sox’s fan base reflected the team’s disproportionality. Indeed, 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, many black Boston-area baseball fans 
felt alienated by the Red Sox and their image, and few patronized Red Sox 
games.68 One white Red Sox fan, queried about the racial atmosphere at 
Red Sox games during that time period, poignantly conjured images of 
apartheid-stricken South Africa by describing the almost entirely white 
crowd as “resembl[ing] a rugby match in Pretoria.”69 
61. See id. at 1–2. 
62. It is arguable, however, that such pre-Title VII discrimination did contravene federal anti-
discrimination law as set forth in § 1981. Section 1981, initially passed as a provision of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 (the “1866 Act”) intended to shield non-whites from race-based oppression in 
slavery’s aftermath, prohibits race-based employment discrimination. See Angela M. Ford, Private 
Alienage Discrimination and the Reconstruction Amendments: The Constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 457, 460–62 (2001). While conventional wisdom suggests § 1981 did not
apply to a private party’s discriminatory behavior prior to the United States Supreme Court’s 1975 and
1976 decisions in Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) and Runyon v. McCrary, 
427 U.S. 160 (1976), respectively, the text of the 1866 Act as well as its legislative history suggest that 
perhaps a § 1981 claim of employment discrimination in the private sector has been viable since the
1866 Act was passed. See N. Jeremi Duru, Exploring Jethroe’s Injustice: The Impact of an Ex-
Ballplayer’s Legal Quest for a Pension on the Movement for Restorative Racial Justice (work-in-
progress, on file with author) (analyzing § 1981’s applicability to the racial discrimination claims of
former Negro League baseball players). 
63. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 69–70, 120–22.
64. See id. at 138–39. 
65. Boston, a city famous for “neighborhoods polarized along racial borders,” id. at 144, became
increasingly polarized as the busing program took hold. See id. at 123. Indeed, the city was “fraught 
with tension,” and, as a consequence, sport, like other aspects of Boston life, was inevitably linked 
with issues of race. See id. at 123–24. 
66. Id. at 139. 
67. Id. at 153. 
68. See id. at 188.
69. Fainaru, supra note 59, at 1. An informal 1991 Boston Globe survey revealed fewer than
eighty blacks at several well-attended Red Sox home games that summer and a more precise 
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The consequence of the Red Sox’s racially imbalanced roster 
construction was a broadly held perception that the Red Sox were a 
“white” team: a team by whites and for whites.70 This perception may well 
have reached its height in early 1986, when former Red Sox player and 
coach Tommy Harper publicly filed with the United States Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) a charge of racial 
discrimination and retaliation against the team.71 He alleged that since 
1971, the team had accepted passes to the segregated Winter Haven Elks 
Club, located in Winter Haven, Florida, where the Red Sox annually 
conduct spring training, and distributed them only to white team 
personnel.72 He further alleged that in 1984 he objected to the practice and 
was told it would cease.73 When the practice did not cease during the 
spring of 1985, and Harper was interviewed about it, he opined that the 
practice was discriminatory.74 Upon publication of the newspaper article 
containing his quotations, Harper alleged he was ostracized and received 
“no further assignments or direction from the Red Sox” for the remainder 
of the 1985 season.75 Then, on December 19, 1985, the Red Sox 
terminated Harper, claiming poor performance,76 and less than two months 
later Harper filed his EEOC charge.77 During the summer of 1986, the 
EEOC determined the Red Sox had committed “unlawful employment 
practices” by firing Harper in retaliation for accusing the organization of 
racism.78  
Etched in history as Major League Baseball’s final holdout against 
integration, well into a decade during which they would employ fewer 
black players than any other Major League organization, and on the heels 
of public accusations of longstanding organizational racism and unlawful 
retaliation against the accuser, the Red Sox’s reputation as a “white” team 
was, in the autumn of 1986, as strong as ever. With this reputation, the 
Red Sox would vie for Major League Baseball’s World Series 
recordation identified just seventy-one blacks among the 34,032 total spectators at the Red Sox-
Toronto Blue Jays contest on Friday night, August 2, 1991. Id. 
70. See id. 
71. See Michael Madden, Harper: Sox Are Racist, Fired Coach Files Charge of Discrimination
Against Club, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1986, at 39.  
72. See id.
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 149. 
77. See Madden, supra note 71, at 39. 
78. Michael Madden, Harper’s Charges Against Sox Upheld, BOSTON GLOBE, July 2, 1986, at
67. 
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Championship. They would lose in tragic fashion, and their loss would 
trigger tragic events.  
1. From Rooting to Rioting: Racial Violence at UMass in the Wake of
the Red Sox’s World Series Defeat
At 11:30 p.m. on October 27, 1986, the New York Mets defeated the 
Red Sox in the final game of a best-of-seven series to claim the World 
Series Championship.79 The loss was devastating for the Red Sox, having 
been only one out short of victory in the sixth game of the series and 
having stormed out to an early lead in the seventh game only to collapse as 
the contest progressed.80 The loss was devastating, too, for Red Sox fans.81 
The team was without a World Series title since 1918, and the team’s fans, 
desperately desiring an end to the drought, were crestfallen, both by the 
fact of the loss and the manner in which it transpired.82 It was a dark day 
for Boston Red Sox baseball.83 
It was, as it turns out, a darker day still for the University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst (“UMass”) community.84 In the aftermath of the 
World Series loss, while much of New England was mourning the Red 
Sox’s historic collapse, members of the UMass community were 
struggling to make sense of an ugly riot involving as many as three 
thousand students, which erupted on the heels of the game’s conclusion.85 
Initially deemed a drunken brawl among baseball fans, further analysis 
revealed a different picture.86 Two separate independent investigations 
conducted after the incident, one by Hampshire County District Attorney 
W. Matthew Ryan and one by Frederick Hurst of the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination, concluded the violence was racially
motivated.87
The Hurst investigation, commissioned by the University’s then-
Chancellor Joseph Duffy, and resulting in a fifty-two-page comprehensive 
79. FREDERICK A. HURST, REPORT ON UMASS INVESTIGATION 1, 11 (1987) [hereinafter HURST
REPORT].  
80. See GLENN STOUT & RICHARD A. JOHNSON, RED SOX CENTURY 410–12, 415 (2000).
81. See id. at 415.
82. See id. 
83. See id. 
84. See Matthew L. Wald, Racism Blamed for Brawl at U. of Massachusetts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6,
1987, at A12; Bonnie V. Winston, Dukakis, Students Meet on UMass Violence, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 
15, 1987, at 43. 
85. See Wald, supra note 84, at A12. 
86. See id. 
87. See Jonathan Kaufman, Jackson Calls for Talks on Minorities and Colleges, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 22, 1987, at 45; Massachusetts U. Scene of Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1988, at 17. 
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report, revealed UMass students largely viewed the Red Sox as a “white” 
team,88 an unsurprising conclusion in light of the aforementioned broader 
prevailing perception to that effect. The Hurst investigation also revealed 
students viewed the Mets, the Red Sox’s opponents, as the Red Sox’s 
antithesis—a “black” team.89 Consequently, the World Series 
confrontation was, to many on campus, both an athletic confrontation and 
a racial confrontation.90 And, according to Hurst, those Red Sox fans 
viewing their team as the “white” team, having just witnessed a substantial 
defeat—in their view both athletic and racial—sought revenge implicating 
both sport and race.91 
As Red Sox fans streamed out of their residences and into a courtyard 
in the campus’s Southwest residential area, at least some did so with an 
agenda of attacking Mets fans, and as the crowd in the courtyard grew, the 
agenda seemed to pervade.92 The Hurst report reveals that the hostilities 
exchanged were initially entirely among whites,93 and, indeed, only fifteen 
to twenty black students were in the courtyard at the time.94 The anger of 
the crowd, however, at some point “perceptibly shifted” toward those few 
black students,95 and as hostilities increased, the crowd was “focusing in 
on a surrogate target against which to take revenge for the Sox loss and 
that surrogate target conveniently became black students.”96 As the crowd 
turned on the black students, any distinction among the black students that 
might have differentiated black Mets fans from black Red Sox fans from 
black students with no rooting interest dissolved, and “[t]hey all became 
Mets fans confronted by an increasingly violent white crowd.”97 
Irrespective of whether the black students supported the Mets, the crowd 
identified the black students with the Mets—the “black” team—and 
visited upon the students the animosity it felt for the team.98 Ultimately, 
during the course of an attack peppered with racial invective, ten students 
sustained injuries requiring treatment, including one student who was 
88. HURST REPORT, supra note 79, at 8; id. at Attachment A, Letter from Len Zakim and Sally
Greenberg, at 2 [hereinafter Zakim, Greenberg Letter].  
89. Id. Lost in the dichotomous simplification of the Red Sox as a “white” team and the Mets as
a “black” team was the reality that both teams fielded Latino players in addition to white and black 
players in 1986. See BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 47, at 588, 591.  
90. See HURST REPORT, supra note 79, at 17. 
91. Id. at 13–24. 
92. See id. at 12. 
93. See id. 
94. See id. at 13 n.1. 
95. Id. at 13. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 14. 
98. Id. 
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kicked and beaten with sticks and poles into unconsciousness.99 And, as 
the riot’s consequence, campus race relations suffered.100  
2. The UMass Riot: Race-Based Team Identification’s Predictable
Consequence
In reflecting on the UMass riot, it becomes necessary to assess whether 
the events were aberrant, on the one hand, or the predictable outcome of 
the factors that fueled them, on the other. If the former, the riot is 
reasonably viewed as a horrific but anomalous event on which a forward-
looking society need not unnecessarily dwell. If the latter, society must be 
concerned with preventing future such incidents. Nyla R. Branscombe and 
Daniel L. Wann’s incisive study, Role of Identification with a Group, 
Arousal, Categorization Processes, and Self-Esteem in Sports Spectator 
Aggression, suggests concern is in order.101  
Branscombe and Wann reveal that aggression and hostility on the part 
of sports spectators results from several factors, including group-level 
identification, categorization processes, and physiological arousal.102 They 
explain that “[t]he link between identifying oneself as a member of a 
group, caring about that identity, and categorization of others as members 
of the same group (the ingroup) or a different group (the outgroup) is well 
supported.”103 This phenomenon creates a tendency, even among group-
identified people with low levels of identification, to view differences 
among groups in terms of “us” versus “them”.104 When, however, the 
99. See id. at 21–22; id. at Attachment A, Zakim, Greenberg Letter, at 2. 
100. This is not to suggest an idyllic racial atmosphere prevailed on campus prior to the incident.
On the contrary, pre-riot racial tension existed. See HURST REPORT, supra note 79, at 39–41. Without 
question, however, the events following the World Series severely exacerbated those tensions. Indeed, 
UMass’s black students were so frightened of racial mob violence occurring on Halloween night just a 
few days after the riot that they marched en masse, demanding the administration take precautionary 
measures. See id. at 32. And during the year following the riot, both then-Governor Michael Dukakis 
and civil rights activist Jesse Jackson visited UMass to address concerns about the racial climate on 
campus and to quell racial animus. See Winston, supra note 84, at 43; Kaufman, supra note 87, at 45. 
The visits and attendant discussions and speeches did little to improve racial harmony on campus. In 
early 1988, frustrated with the continued occurrence of racially motivated incidents at the University 
and the University’s slow implementation of the recommendations issued in the Hurst report, 200 
black students took over a University building in protest. See Massachusetts U. Scene of Protest, supra 
note 87, at 17; UMass Building Takeover Rooted in Longstanding Racial Tension, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Feb. 14, 1988, at 44.  
101. See Nyla R. Branscombe & Daniel L. Wann, Role of Identification with a Group, Arousal,
Categorization Processes, and Self-Esteem in Sports Spectator Aggression, 45 HUM. REL. 1013, 1015–
21 (1992).  
102. Id. at 1015. 
103. Id. at 1019. 
104. See id.
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allegiance to a group is particularly intense, the “us” versus “them” 
dynamic is more pronounced.105 Branscombe and Wann suggest allegiance 
to nation as emblematic of particularly intense group identification with 
the potential to spur tragic societal consequences.106 Racial allegiance, at 
least in the United States, certainly has the potential to spark group 
identification of similar intensity to that of national allegiance and, thus, 
the potential to catalyze negative societal consequences.107  
The power of racial allegiance to create an “us” versus “them” dynamic 
in America has historically been particularly clear in the context of two 
members of different races meeting in competition. Boxing, a sport in 
which the goal is outright physical domination, provides an early example. 
When former heavyweight boxing champion Jim Jeffries, a white man, 
challenged then-current champion Jack Johnson, a black man, in 1910, the 
affair was, without question, more about race than sport.108 During his 
tenure as heavyweight champion, Johnson enraged much of white 
America by unabashedly refusing to be racially subjugated, and much of 
white America called on Jeffries to defeat Johnson on behalf of all 
whites.109 Racial hatred of Johnson was so pervasive among those 
attending the match that “spectators were required to check their guns at 
the gate” for fear Jeffries’ supporters might otherwise shoot Johnson dead 
in the boxing ring.110 Much to the disappointment of those desiring 
Johnson’s defeat, Johnson beat Jeffries badly, and, in the aftermath of the 
match, race riots erupted “like prickly heat all over the country.”111 By the 
time the violence subsided, hundreds of blacks were injured and at least 
eleven were left dead.112  
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See generally Aune Valk & Kristel Karu, Ethnic Attitudes in Relation to Ethnic Pride and
Ethnic Differentiation, 141 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 583, 584–86 (2001); Bill Wassmuth & M.J. Bryant, Not 
in Our World: A Perspective of Community Organizing Against Hate, 1 J. HATE STUD. 109 (2001/02). 
108. See GEOFFREY C. WARD, UNFORGIVABLE BLACKNESS: THE RISE AND FALL OF JACK
JOHNSON 200–01 (2004). 
109. See id. at 133–35, 164–65, 225–26.
110. Phoebe Weaver Williams, Performing in a Racially Hostile Environment, 6 MARQ. SPORTS
L.J. 287, 292–93 (1996).
111. WARD, supra note 108, at 208–11, 216.
112. See id. at 217. While eleven riot-related deaths were confirmed, the estimated death tally ran
as high as twenty-six. Id. The killings were geographically diffuse and frightful in their accounts:  
A white passenger on a Houston streetcar slit a black man’s throat because he had dared to 
cheer for Johnson. When whites in Wheeling, West Virginia, came upon a Negro driving a 
handsome automobile, as Jack Johnson was now famous for doing, they dragged him out 
from behind the steering wheel and hanged him. Near Uvalda, Georgia, white riflemen 
opened fire on a black construction camp, killing three and wounding five. 
Id. 
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The passage of nearly half a century would do nothing to quell the 
concern of racial allegiance sparking violence in conjunction with an 
interracial boxing match. Indeed, this particular concern motivated public 
policy.113 For instance, as of 1955, the state of Louisiana statutorily barred 
all interracial bouts.114 When a black boxer challenged the restriction with 
a lawsuit, the state’s legal strategy was simple: they asserted “the police 
power defense” under the theory that “[s]urely if Blacks and Whites 
participated together in [boxing] contests race riots would follow.”115 The 
threat of racial allegiance among fans morphing into racial violence 
remained through the civil rights movement and into the post-civil rights 
era, even when competition between two athletes of different races was 
not direct, as evidenced by the barrage of racially motivated hate mail and 
death threats Hank Aaron received as he approached and eventually broke 
Babe Ruth’s career MLB home run record.116 
More recently, Tiger Woods and Venus and Serena Williams have 
endured race-enflamed disparagement while competing primarily against 
white opponents in golf and tennis, respectively. Like Johnson and Aaron 
when they competed, Woods has received death threats, receiving his first 
as a sixteen-year-old amateur golfer.117 Upon becoming a professional, the 
threats continued and, as the only black player on the Professional Golf 
Association tour, Woods has had to endure hecklers calling him a nigger 
on golf courses throughout the nation.118 While there is no indication that 
Venus and Serena Williams have received death threats, they too have 
experienced racial antagonism in connection with competition. Most 
notably, the Williams sisters were so disconcerted by what their family 
viewed as racially motivated taunts while Serena was defeating Belgian 
star Kim Clijsters to claim the 2001 Pacific Life Open championship in 
Indian Wells, California, that neither player has since returned to the 
113. See Evelyn L. Wilson, Louis Berry—A Man Among Men, 20 S. U. L. REV. 149, 172–74
(1993). 
114. See id. at 172. 
115. Id. at 174. 
116. See Williams, supra note 110, at 293. 
117. See Jon Saraceno, Sometimes It’s Scary Being Tiger, USA TODAY, July 20, 2000, at 12C;
Tiger Woods Says Death Threats Continue, JET, Nov. 24, 1997, at 54. 
118. See Jon Fasman, The Long Game: Shut Out For So Long From Mainstream Sport, Black
Athletes Now Dominate in America, OBSERVER, July 3, 2005, at 1; Neil McLeman, Tiger: My Race-
Hate Nightmare, MIRROR, June 15, 2005, at 58; Saraceno, supra note 117, at 1. Notably, Woods does 
not identify as black, but rather as “Cablinasian,” “which encompasses his entire Caucasian, black, 
American Indian and Asian heritage.” Fasman, supra, at 1. That Woods is regarded by others as black, 
however, became clear to him early in life when, at the age of five, several sixth-graders bound him to 
a tree and threw rocks at him after painting “Nigger” across his chest. Id.  
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tournament despite its standing as the sixth-largest tennis tournament in 
the world.119  
Intense group identification is not, however, restricted to race-based or 
nation-based identification, and sports fans who identify with groups as 
such do not restrict their identification to athletes competing individually. 
A strong “us” versus “them” dynamic also develops when fans identify 
strongly with a sports team.120 Under such circumstances, the fans, 
according to Branscombe and Wann, “view the team as a representation of 
themselves . . . and as part of their own social identity.”121 Consequently, 
“[a]n affront or loss on the part of the team . . . is a loss for the self.”122 
The study ultimately reveals that both race-based identification and team-
based identification, in isolation, can result in derogation of, and hostility 
toward, fans of another team or members of another race.123 The risk of 
such derogation and hostility, therefore, would certainly exist, and perhaps 
be amplified, when that isolation disintegrates—when team represents 
race, and fans are, thus, engaged in race-based team identification.  
Fortunately, teams are less susceptible to attracting race-based 
identification than individual athletes, because, in the post-civil rights era, 
and in the absence of race-considered roster construction, teams tend to 
include players of different races.124 Thus, even when spectators, on the 
basis of race, identify with or bear ill will toward a member of a team, the 
presence of members of various races on the team insulates the team from 
being identified with one race. The events in Buffalo, New York, in 1993 
when the hometown Bills faced off against the visiting Miami Dolphins 
are illustrative. 
119. See Charles Elmore, Jeers Still Haunt Serena, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 16, 2005, at 11C;
John Roberts, Fashionable for Serena to Block California Return, INDEPENDENT, Mar. 17, 2005, at 46; 
Jeff Williams, Sibling Revelry in its Ninth Slam: Williams Sisters Head to Round of 16 in One of Their 
Earliest Meetings, NEWSDAY, Sept. 3, 2005, at A40. Although there is no dispute that the Williams 
sisters were jeered, booed, and taunted during the match, the crowd’s disappointment that Serena 
reached the final only after Venus, citing knee tendonitis, withdrew from a semi-final match scheduled 
to pit the sisters against each other may have contributed to the crowd’s animosity. See ELMORE, 
supra, at 11C. 
120. See Branscombe & Wann, supra note 101, at 1019. 
121. Id. at 1017. 
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1019–21. 
124. Although professional hockey, a sport in which few non-whites compete, presents a notable
exception, issues of diversity and discrimination have impacted hockey as well, at times dividing 
“French-Canadian and European players from their American and Anglo-Canadian counterparts.” 
Kenneth L. Shropshire, Minority Issues in Contemporary Sports, 15 STAN L. & POL’Y REV. 189, 191 
n.9 (2004) (citing Lawrence M. Kahn, Discrimination in Professional Sports: A Survey of the
Literature, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 395 (1991)).
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Throughout the game, Bills fans racially taunted Miami Dolphins 
linebacker Bryan Cox.125 In addition to berating Cox with racial slurs, fans 
loudly threatened to kill him.126 One fan, in particular, graphically 
represented the desired murder as a lynching, an image conjuring the 
ugliest days of America’s racially enflamed history: The fan held up a 
black-painted dummy with Cox’s jersey number scrawled on it and a 
noose around its neck.127 Across the dummy’s chest was written “Wanted 
. . . Dead.”128 As Professor Phoebe Williams suggests, such a display 
palpably arouses a sense of fear and potential racial aggression because, 
indeed, “[t]he parallel between a lynching symbol hoisted in the midst of 
jeering crowds screaming racial epithets for victory and the scenes of 
lynch mobs is remarkable.”129 Fortunately, violence did not erupt. 
There is no evidence to suggest that either the Bills or the Dolphins 
competing that day were products of race-considered roster construction. 
With both teams having similar demographic composition, the merciless 
racial attack on Cox could remain an isolated attack. This is so because the 
taunting fans were, even as they assailed Cox, cheering for their team and, 
thus, the black players on it. A pure “us” versus “them” dynamic—which, 
in this case, is to say a pure “white” versus “black” dynamic—could not 
easily gain traction, because the Bills were not a “white” team. A verbal 
attack in this case, were it not just against Cox but against all black players 
competing, would be, as it were, self-inflicted, in that it would be an 
assault against the fans’ beloved Bills just as it would be an assault against 
the Dolphins. Imagine, however, that the fans viewed the Bills as a 
“white” team and the Dolphins as a “black” team. Under this scenario, the 
fans’ articulated racial sentiments, if broadened beyond Cox, would not be 
self-inflicted but would instead bear entirely on the Dolphins, and it would 
certainly seem that an “us” versus “them” dynamic might more easily 
flourish. Whether such a dynamic would, in fact, flourish is subject to 
speculation. The Branscombe-Wann study leaves little doubt, however, 
that under such circumstances, with the teams deemed to represent 
different races, the risk of violence would loom. 
Indeed, the consequences of race-based team identification would be 
exacerbated as fans became increasingly physiologically aroused through 
125. See Williams, supra note 110, at 296–97. 
126. Id. at 297. 
127. Id. 
128. Id.
129. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
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viewing the competition.130 This is because such physiological arousal 
reduces cognitive complexity, therefore increasing “judgment-simplifying 
strategies” such as reliance on group stereotypes.131 Under these 
circumstances, Branscombe and Wann conclude, fans may well “behave 
aggressively toward the ‘different’ outgroup members, particularly using 
such persons as scapegoats when the ingroup’s own team is defeated.”132  
This is, according to Hurst, precisely what happened at UMass 
following the 1986 World Series’s seventh game. Red Sox fans—the 
ingroup—viewed their team as the “white” team and the Mets as the 
“black” team.133 Aroused by watching the game and angered by the defeat 
at the hands of the “black” team, the Red Sox fans, through what would 
certainly appear to be judgment simplification, identified the black 
students in the area, regardless of rooting interest, with the Mets.134 As 
Hurst puts it, the black students “all became Mets fans confronted by an 
increasingly violent white crowd.”135 The black students became the 
outgroup, were scapegoated by the ingroup Red Sox fans as responsible 
for the defeat, and became the “surrogate target” for the ingroup’s 
hostility.136  
Branscombe and Wann’s analysis is eerily predictive of the UMass 
riot, suggesting the riot was, rather than an anomaly, a foreseeable 
occurrence in light of the then-prevailing race-based team identification on 
campus. While, as discussed above, Red Sox management’s historical 
racial animus is well documented, it merits noting that racial animus need 
not be at the root of race-considered roster construction for negative 
societal consequences to flow or for Title VII liability to potentially 
attach.137 A brief discussion of the NBA team with which the Red Sox 
share a city, the Boston Celtics, makes this clear.  
130. See Branscombe & Wann, supra note 101, at 1015–17. 
131. Id. at 1020. 
132. Id. at 1021. 
133. HURST REPORT, supra note 79, at 8.
134. See id. at 14. 
135. Id.
136. Id. 
137. See Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action: A Critical
Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious Decision Making Under Title 
VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1014–15 (1997). 
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B. Considering the Celtics: From Integrationist Pioneer to “the White
Man’s Lone NBA Outpost”138
Like the Red Sox of the 1980s and early 1990s, the Boston Celtics of
that time period were a team comprised disproportionately of white 
players and viewed as a “white” team.139 The Celtics, however, arrived at 
that designation via a different route. In sharp contrast with the Red Sox, 
MLB’s final team to employ a player of color, the Celtics were the NBA’s 
first team to do so.140 In addition, the Celtics were the first NBA franchise 
to put an entirely black team on the court at one time,141 and the first major 
American sports franchise of any sort to hire a black coach.142 While the 
Red Sox for many years fought integration, even at the expense of 
success,143 the Celtics seemed bent on pursuing success whatever the race 
of the individuals who could help them achieve it.144 And the Celtics met 
with success, indeed unparalleled success, winning eleven NBA titles in 
thirteen years and eight titles in a row between 1957 and 1969.145  
Two decades later, however, after blacks had not only been broadly 
accepted in the NBA, but, in fact, constituted nearly three-fourths of the 
league’s players,146 the Celtics were conspicuous as the NBA team 
employing fewer black players than any other.147 Indeed, during the 1985–
86 and 1986–87 seasons, the Celtics’s twelve-man roster consisted of four 
138. BRYANT, supra note 41, at 144. 
139. See ARATON & BONDY, supra note 41, at xiii; BRYANT, supra note 41, at 144; Gregory
Witcher & Jonathan Kaufman, Blacks Split on Backing Celtics, BOSTON GLOBE, June 4, 1987, at 1.  
140. See supra text accompanying note 41.
141. See ARATON & BONDY, supra note 41, at 58; BRYANT, supra note 41, at 143. 
142. See ARATON & BONDY, supra note 41, at 51; BRYANT, supra note 41, at 143. 
143. Enmeshed in its commitment to segregation, the Red Sox declined to sign, in addition to
other young and talented black players, both Jackie Robinson and Willie Mays, two Hall of Fame 
baseball players considered among the sport’s all-time greats. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 31, 41–
46. Legend suggests the Red Sox endured an eighty-six-year drought (1918–2004) between World
Series victories because they sold Babe Ruth to the New York Yankees in 1919, causing the great
Ruth to burden the organization with the “Curse of the Bambino”. Fainaru, supra note 59, at 1. The
more likely, not to mention more rational, explanation for the Red Sox’s World Series drought was the
team’s initial refusal, and later reluctance, to field black players, and the consequent foregoing of
talent this caused. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 46; Fainaru, supra note 59, at 1. Indeed, facing a
team including Jackie Robinson and Willie Mays in addition to Red Sox hitting great Ted Williams
would have presented a formidable challenge to any opposition. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 46.
144. When Celtics then-owner John Y. Brown announced he was drafting Cooper, a fellow NBA
owner reputedly confronted him noting that Cooper was black, to which Brown matter-of-factly 
responded, “I don’t give a damn if he’s striped or polka dot or plaid . . . Boston takes Charles Cooper 
of Duquesne.” ARATON & BONDY, supra note 41, at 51.  
145. See THE OFFICIAL NBA BASKETBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 21, 106 (Alex Sachare ed. 1994) 
146. By the 1985–86 NBA season, blacks constituted 72% of the NBA’s players. ARATON &
BONDY, supra note 41, at 80. 
147. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 143–44. 
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black players and eight white players and stood in sharp contrast with the 
composition of the league, in which nine of every twelve players were 
black and only three of every twelve players were white.148  
The Celtics’ transformation was stark, and spurred it seems by 
professional basketball’s, and thus the Celtics’, evolution during the 1970s 
from a little known entertainment source into a substantial economic 
enterprise reliant on attracting a fan-base to pay admission and fill arena 
seats.149 Attracting fans in racially polarized Boston, and thus ensuring 
economic viability, demanded a largely white team.150 Alan Cohen, a part-
owner of the Celtics beginning in 1983, has suggested as much, expressing 
the potential value of “hav[ing] some balance on the team, in terms of 
race” in a league that was at the time comprised overwhelmingly of black 
players.151 Cohen was neither alone in this sentiment nor its most forceful 
proponent. Fellow NBA owner Ted Stepien of the Cleveland Cavaliers 
expressed his view on race-considered roster construction in the early 
1980s, indicating that on an NBA team, “half the squad should be white. I 
think people are afraid to speak out on that subject. White people have to 
148. See ARATON & BONDY, supra note 41 at 80 (picturing the 1985–86 Celtics team); Witcher &
Kaufman, supra note 139, at 1. That the 1985–86 Celtics and the 1986–87 Celtics were exceptionally 
good teams does not suggest all of the team’s members were necessarily selected on merit with no 
consideration of race. Rather, it suggests the primary contributors were meritoriously selected. Authors 
Harvey Araton and Filip Bondy write, “[t]he Celtics’ pattern is painfully obvious: whenever they have 
had enough strength among their top eight players to contend for a championship, they have stacked 
the back end of their roster with token whites.” ARATON & BONDY, supra note 41, at 125. Race-
considered roster construction, therefore, prevailed most significantly among players who rarely saw 
action in meaningful games:  
With the exception of Artis Gilmore for forty-seven games in 1988, the Celtics’ backup 
center position to Robert Parish was virtually a closed white union shop, passed down from 
Rick Robey to Eric Fernstern to Greg Kite to Bill Walton to Mark Acres to Brad Lohaus to 
Joe Kleine. If a fading white veteran such as Walton, Pete Maravich, Scott Wedman, or Jim 
Paxson was available, the Celtics could be counted on to make room. 
Id. at 122. See also BRYANT, supra note 41, at 144 (“It’s been a running joke for years: white plus 
height equals a job with the Boston Celtics. The white guy will always find a home in a Boston jersey. 
If it wasn’t Jerry Sichting, it was Scott Wedman, or Greg Kite, Mark Acre, Jim Paxson, or Fred 
Roberts.”). Notably, maintaining a disproportionately white corps of reserves was not anomalous at the 
time and was, in fact, the norm in the NBA. See infra text accompanying note 159.  
149. See ARATON & BONDY, supra note 41, at 58.
150. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 144. Former longtime Celtic Jo Jo White ascribes no racist
motives to the late legendary Celtics General Manger Red Auerbach’s crafting of predominately white 
Celtic teams. Rather, he believes the personnel decisions were economically motivated as the city of 
Boston “wouldn’t support a majority black team, even if it were successful.” Id. Auerbach was, 
therefore, in White’s view “merely responding to the will of the people.” Id. See also ARATON & 
BONDY, supra note 41, at 58.  
151. Id. at 123. 
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have white heroes. I’ll be truthful, I respect [blacks], but I need white 
people. It’s in me.”152 
If the Celtics did, indeed, conclude they needed a certain number of 
white players on the team to satisfy white fans, their conclusion found 
support in empirical research. According to a study in the American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology published just a few years after the 
Celtics fielded teams with eight white players and four black players, 
“white fans [of the NBA] have a taste for seeing white players.”153 
Interestingly, the study suggests that fans who wanted to see white players 
did not care whether the white players actually played in games as long as 
they were in uniform sitting on the bench.154 These findings might explain 
the disproportionate representation of white players at the sparingly used 
ends of NBA benches. While, in 1991, 72.4% of the league’s players were 
black and 27.6% were white, of the players on each team with the fewest 
average points per game, only 47.4% were black and 52.6% were white.155 
That is to say, whites were disproportionately represented among the 
league’s infrequently used reserves. This phenomenon of white players 
disproportionately filling reserve roles has persisted and, interestingly, has 
achieved some level of acceptance in NBA circles.156 Players and formers 
players, black and white alike, have acknowledged it as a part of NBA 
life.157 Indeed, the pervasiveness of the practice is such that NBA and 
college coaching great Larry Brown felt the need to prepare his black 
college players for it.158 Brown explained, “[t]he players were better off 
knowing ahead of time . . . . That way, they’re motivated to work harder. 
They have to be a little bit better than the white guys in order to make the 
pros.”159 
152. Id. at 181. 
153. Eleanor Brown, Diane Keenan & Richard Spiro, Wage and Nonwage Discrimination in
Professional Basketball: Do Fans Affect It?, 50 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 333, 343 (1991).  
154. Id. at 339. 
155. ARATON & BONDY, supra note 41, at 124. 
156. See id. at 122–25. 
157. See id. Bob Cousy, the former Celtic great and long-time Celtic television commentator,
described a typical player selection process when choosing among reserves as follows: “they’ll say, 
Okay, cut the shit, we’re talking about this white guy who is six-five and that black guy who is six-five 
. . . And if they’re absolutely even, or close to even, then, yeah, maybe they’ll keep the white guy.” Id. 
at 123.  
158. See id. at 125. 
159. Id. While the Brown, Keenan & Spiro study concludes that “white fans have a taste for
seeing white players” and that white players are overrepresented in NBA cities with large white 
populations, the study also challenges Coach Brown’s sentiment, concluding that “minimum entry 
skills [for the NBA] do not seem dramatically higher for blacks.” Brown, Keenan & Spiro, supra note 
153, at 340. A similar, more recent, study draws the same conclusion, indicating there remains a 
correlation between a team’s racial composition and the racial composition of the city in which the 
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Whether the Celtics believed that fielding a disproportionately white 
team was economically advantageous or whether they fielded a 
disproportionately white team for other reasons, it is extremely likely that 
they fielded a disproportionately white team on purpose.160 Sociologist 
Wornie Reed of the University of Massachusetts, who analyzed the roster 
of the aforementioned disproportionately white 1986–87 Celtics as they 
played out the season, concluded that such extreme racial imbalance was 
no accident.161 The Celtics, a team on which 66% of the players were 
white in a league in which 28% of players were white, seem clearly to 
have engaged in race-considered roster construction, and in doing so, 
created a disproportionately white roster.162  
Consequently, like the Red Sox of the same era, the Celtics were 
widely viewed as a “white” team,163 and as at UMass among Red Sox 
fans, a sense of racial confrontation followed. As the Celtics worked 
through the season with their disproportionately white squad, there seemed 
to exist in the Boston Garden a sense of racial encounter during their 
games.164 Whatever the reaction to other exciting performances during the 
course of a game, “the truly raucous applause always came when Kevin 
McHale, the [Celtics’s] white power forward, blocked the shot of a 
superstar black player.”165 Boston Globe columnist Bob Ryan, who 
observed the phenomenon, reluctantly recognized that race lay at the root 
of the eruptions: “I didn’t necessarily want to think about it, but I knew the 
reason why.”166 
Such transmogrification of athletic competition into racial competition 
is of substantial concern in a nation still battling to deal with its legacy of 
team is based, suggesting individual “teams are responding to customer discrimination,” but also 
concluding that there does not appear to exist league-wide discrimination. Richard Burdekin, Richard 
Hossfeld & Janet Smith, Are NBA Fans Becoming Indifferent to Race? Evidence from the 1990s, 6 J. 
SPORTS ECON. 144, 147–48 (2002).  
160. See Witcher & Kaufman, supra note 139, at 1. 
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. ARATON & BONDY, supra note 41, at XIII. The NBA’s Golden State Warriors’ vice president
at the time, Al Attles, went further to suggest the perception of the Celtics as a white team was so 
ingrained that even if the roster demographics shifted that view would prevail: “Whether or not they’re 
a white team, the perception is there . . . . The perception is what matters.” Id. Indeed, as the Celtics 
played for the 1986–87 NBA championship against the Los Angeles Lakers, the Boston Globe 
reported that much of Boston’s black community desired a Lakers victory, feeling the hometown 
Celtics were not their team, but were instead a team representing white Bostonians. See Witcher & 
Kaufman, supra note 139, at 1.  
164. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 145.
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
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racial subjugation and discrimination.167 It supplants the joy of sport with 
the pain and fear associated with that legacy and creates the risk of 
devolution from perceived racial competition into actual racial violence.168 
And although no racial violence erupted in the Boston Garden during the 
1986–87 season, as discussed above, race-based team identification 
certainly creates such a risk, to a greater degree even than race-enflamed 
sport spectating in the absence of race-based team identification.  
If America seeks to embrace the aims of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
it can afford neither the threat of looming racial violence nor the violence 
itself. Healing the nation’s festering racial wounds and increasing racial 
harmony requires preventing racial violence and the circumstances that 
trigger it. Considering the prominence of sport in our society,169 
eradicating unlawful race-considered roster construction, through 
increased Title VII scrutiny, would certainly serve that end.  
III. THE TITLE VII CASE: APPLYING THE STATUTE IN THE RACE-
CONSIDERED ROSTER CONSTRUCTION CONTEXT 
Neither the Red Sox nor the Celtics have, in recent years, constructed 
rosters as racially disproportionate to others in their respective leagues as 
they once did. Although as of 1991 the Red Sox’s entire organization—
including all of its minor league teams as well as its major league team—
featured the lowest number of black players among Major League 
organizations,170 the following several years would portend significant 
change. With the 1992 major league arrival of black minor league standout 
Mo Vaughn,171 the Red Sox’s first signing of a black free agent player in 
1993,172 and the 1994 appointment of general manager Dan Duquette, a 
progressive administrator intent on improving the team without regard for 
its racial composition,173 the Red Sox entered a new era in which they 
167. See Williams, supra note 110, at 297–98.
168. See id.
169. Sport, perhaps more than any other societal institution, reflects the essence of the society
within which it exists. See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 39, at 17. As Professor Harry Edwards puts it, 
“sport inevitably recapitulates the character, structure, and dynamics of human and institutional 
relationships within and between societies and the ideological values and sentiments that rationalize 
and justify those relationships.” Harry Edwards, The End of the “Golden Age” of Black Sports 
Participation, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1007 (1997).  
170. See Fainaru, supra note 59, at 1. 
171. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 221. 
172. See id. at 223, 231.
173. See id. at 230. 
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began fielding increasingly diverse teams.174 The Celtics experienced a 
similar transition in the early 1990s when Dave Gavitt assumed the 
general manager post and a group of young black Celtics players, 
including Dee Brown, Brian Shaw, and Reggie Lewis, gained prominence 
as the building blocks of the Celtics’ future.175  
The phenomenon of race-considered roster construction has, however, 
remained a factor in professional sport through the 1990s and into the new 
century. While the Red Sox and Celtics no longer consistently field 
racially disproportionate teams, the NBA’s Utah Jazz, an organization 
recognized during the 1980s as being similarly racially imbalanced,176 for 
instance, continues to do so. Beginning with the 1990–91 NBA season, 
sports and society expert Dr. Richard Lapchick (originally in association 
with Northeastern University’s Center for the Study of Sport in Society 
and later in association with the University of Central Florida’s Institute 
for Diversity and Ethics in Sport), has compiled an annual analysis of 
player demographics.177 In each season for which Dr. Lapchick has 
compiled statistics, the percentage of white players on the Utah Jazz’s 
roster has outstripped the percentage of white players in the league.178 This 
is not to suggest the Jazz organization harbors racial animus toward black 
players. Indeed, it is more likely the case that, like the Celtics of the 
1980s, the Jazz has limited its number of black players to appeal to a fan-
base centered in Salt Lake City, Utah, a city with a higher percentage of 
white residents than any other city home to an NBA team.179 Indeed, both 
174. See id. Tommy Harper’s views, twenty years after he filed his EEOC charge against the Red
Sox, reveal the extent to which the Red Sox have shed their reputation as a racist or “white” team. In a 
February 1, 2006, Boston Globe article, Harper, now a member of the Red Sox’s community relations 
department, recounted his sense of exclusion as a player and coach with the team, but explained he 
finally felt truly accepted as a part of the organization. See Gordon Edes, Harper Finally at Home, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 2006, at 10. “I never felt a part of the Red Sox family,” Harper is quoted as 
saying, “until now.” Id.  
175. See ARATON & BONDY, supra note 41, at 243, 224. 
176. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 144. 
177. See UCF College of Business Administration, Richard Lapchick (Biography), http://www.
bus.ucf.edu/sport/cgi-bin/site/sitew.cgi (follow “Richard Lapchick, Endowed Chair/Director” 
hyperlink) (last visited May 11, 2006).  
178. See RICHARD LAPCHICK, THE 2004 RACIAL AND GENDER REPORT CARD: NATIONAL
BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION 17 (2005) (listing percentages of white players in the NBA from the 
1990–91 season through the 2003–04 season), available at http://www.bus.ucf.edu/sport/public/ 
downloads/NBA_Report_Card_2004.pdf (notably, Dr. Lapchick did not compile statistics for the 
2002–03 NBA season); NBA.com, JAZZ: All-Time Roster, http://www.nba.com/jazz/history/history_ 
roster_ah.html?nav=ArticleList (last visited May 11, 2006); Players Index, www.basket-stats.info/ 
players/abc/a.htm (last visited May 11, 2006). 
179. See U.S. Census Bureau, Salt Lake City, Utah—Fact Sheet, http://factfinder.census.gov
(search for “Salt Lake City, Utah”). 
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the American Journal of Economics and Sociology study180 and a more 
recent 2002 study published in the Journal of Sports Economics,181 predict 
such an outcome. Because some white fans prefer seeing white players, 
teams based in areas with disproportionately white populations are 
incentivized to field disproportionately white teams.182  
A. The Significance of Disproportionality
Whatever the motivation for maintaining a disproportionately white
team, that disproportionality sets the stage for Title VII liability. It is well 
recognized in employment discrimination law, and antidiscrimination law 
more broadly, that proving intentional discrimination in a particular 
instance is a difficult endeavor.183 This is because racial discrimination, 
once overtly expressed with impunity, more often takes a covert, and 
perhaps even subconscious, form in the post-civil rights era.184 As 
Professor Charles Lawrence explains in his groundbreaking exploration of 
subtle racism, “in a society that no longer condones overt racial attitudes 
and behavior, many of these attitudes will be repressed and prevented from 
reaching awareness in an undisguised form.”185 This is no less the case in 
the sports industry.186 The absence of overt discrimination, consequently, 
cannot reasonably be taken to mean the absence of discrimination. Thus, 
to deny liability where the imprimatur of racial discrimination is not 
evident with regard to an adverse employment decision would be to deny 
liability when it might appropriately lie. Whether a black player alleges 
discrimination as a part of a class or as an individual plaintiff, therefore, 
the extent to which the allegedly discriminatory team is disproportionately 
white would be a key factor in assessing liability.  
In the class context, the Supreme Court, in its 1977 examination of 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,187 recognized the 
danger of employers escaping liability when discrimination exists but is 
not readily apparent on the face of a particular employment decision, and 
180. Brown, Keenan & Spiro, supra note 153.
181. Burdekin, Hossfeld & Smith, supra note 159 
182. See Brown, Keenan & Spiro, supra note 153, at 343; Burdekin, Hossfeld & Smith, supra
note 159, at 147–48.  
183. See Tristan K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account
of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 95–99 (2003). 
184. See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (1987). 
185. Id. at 356. 
186. See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 39, at 9. 
187. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). 
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crafted a model of proof for establishing liability under such 
circumstances.188 Teamsters analysis compares the percentage of a 
particular racial group in a defendant’s workforce with the percentage of 
that racial group in the broader labor market.189 With no discrimination, 
goes the theory, the percentages should be virtually the same.190 Dissimilar 
percentages, therefore, create an inference of systemic discrimination and 
a presumption of discrimination in a particular instance.191 Similar logic 
flows in the individual context, in which the Supreme Court has concluded 
“statistics as to [a defendant’s] employment policy and practice may be 
helpful” in determining the veracity of a defendant’s denial of 
discrimination where “the [racial] composition of defendant’s labor force 
is itself reflective of restrictive or exclusionary practices.”192  
To be impactful in either context, however, the disproportionality must 
be statistically significant.193 Consider the Utah Jazz during the 2003–04 
season, the most recent season for which Dr. Lapchick has published 
statistics regarding the NBA’s racial composition. During that season, the 
Jazz’s roster was 39% black,194 while the broader labor market, the 
188. Id. at 337–40. See also United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 551 (1971)
(“Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the courts have frequently relied upon statistical 
evidence to prove a violation . . . . In many cases the only available avenue of proof is the use of racial 
statistics to uncover clandestine and covert discrimination by the employer or union involved.”); 
Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 816–
18 (2004). 
189. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 337–40. See also Michelle Adams, Causation and Responsibility in
Tort and Affirmative Action, 79 TEX. L. REV. 643, 688–90 (2001). 
190. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340 n.20, providing as follows:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative in a case such as this one only
because such imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent
explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time
result in a work force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the
population in the community from which employees are hired. 
191. See id. 
192. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 & n.19 (1973) (second alteration in
original) (citation omitted). See JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & GEORGE M. STRICKLER, JR., THE LAW OF 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 68 (5th ed. 2001); HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & 
ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE 231 nn.3–4 (2d ed. 
2004). 
193. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293 (1987) (“statistical proof normally must present
a ‘stark’ pattern to be accepted as the sole proof of discriminatory intent”) (citation omitted). 
194. Of the eighteen players who were members of the Jazz during the 2003–04 regular season,
seven—Raja Bell, Keon Clark, Jarron Collins, Mikki Moore, Michael Ruffin, DeShawn Stephenson 
and Maurice Williams—are black. See NBA.com, supra note 178; http://www.hoopsstats.com/ 
basketball/fantasy/nba/utah-jazz/team/roster/04/28/; Players Index, supra note 178. One of the Jazz’s 
players that season, Carlos Arroyo, is Latino, hailing from Puerto Rico. Id. at http://www.basket-
stats.info/players/playerfile/a/carlos-arroyo.htm. The remainder of the Jazz’s 2003–04 players are 
white, hailing from either the United States or Europe. See generally id. (for player profiles).  
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NBA,195 was 76% black.196 A disparity certainly exists, but if the disparity 
does not have statistical significance, that is to say, if the magnum of the 
disparity is insufficient to suggest it results from intentional discrimination 
rather than coincidence, its legal relevance withers.197 The manner in 
which statistical significance is appropriately assessed in employment 
discrimination cases is a matter of seemingly endless debate.198 Indeed, 
any statistical analysis a party makes is certain to be challenged by the 
opposing party as to the statistical test used, the assumptions employed in 
conducting the test, and the conclusion the test suggests.199 So, although 
the above-described disparity certainly seems stark, whether it demands a 
presumption of discrimination as a legal matter will depend on the 
statistical approaches of the litigants and the presiding court’s assessment 
of those approaches.200  
Assuming a court determines the disparity in the case of the 2003–04 
Jazz to be statistically significant, and assuming the Jazz are unable to 
successfully counter the plaintiffs’ statistical analysis or show the disparity 
resulted from neutral standards, black players claiming discrimination on 
the part of the Jazz organization would successfully establish Title VII 
liability and, therefore, the propriety of injunctive relief.201 With a 
195. What constitutes the relevant labor market for purposes of disparate treatment statistical
analysis is certain to engender significant debate among parties to an employment discrimination case. 
See Fred W. Alvarez, Michael J. Levy & Shirley C. Wang, Class Actions and Pattern and Practice 
Claims: Overview of Theories, Defenses, Settlements and the Government’s Activist Role, 591 PLI/LIT 
275, 308 (1998). While the broader NBA, comprised of individuals with a skill level the Jazz would be 
seeking, would seem the most appropriate labor market against which to assess the Jazz’s team 
composition, the Jazz might insist a different labor market is more appropriate for the analysis. For 
instance, the Jazz might argue the relevant labor market includes all NBA players as well as players in 
competitive European leagues, leagues that have, in recent years, produced an increasing number of 
players with NBA-caliber skills. See Heather E. Morrow, Comment, The Wide World of Sports is 
Getting Wider: A Look at Drafting Foreign Players into U.S. Professional Sports, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 
649, 688–89 (2004). Adding the players in the top European leagues—leagues with a higher 
percentage of white players than the NBA—to the relevant labor market would decrease the 
percentage of black players in the relevant labor market, reduce the disparity between the Jazz’s racial 
composition and the market’s racial composition, and perhaps, therefore, decrease the likelihood of 
statistical significance. 
196. See LAPCHICK, supra note 178, at 17. 
197. See Green, supra note 183, at 121. 
198. See id. at 121–22. 
199. See id. 
200. See id.
201. There lacks uniformity in the law as to whether, in addition to the statistical showing,
plaintiffs must present anecdotal evidence of intentional discrimination to establish Title VII liability 
under the Teamsters analysis. See John Cocchi Day, Retelling the Story of Affirmative Action: 
Reflections on a Decade of Federal Jurisprudence in the Public Workplace, 89 CAL. L. REV. 59, 96–
98 (2001). It is clear, though, that some courts have deemed the statistical showing sufficient. See 
United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).  
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presumption of discrimination in place, an individual black player would 
be entitled to damages if the Jazz were unable to show race was irrelevant 
to the team’s decision regarding the particular player, meaning the player 
would have been hired for legitimate reasons.  
B. Statistical (In)significance?: Pursuing Liability in the Absence of
Statistical Disproportionality
Even if a court were to determine the disparity to be statistically
insignificant, however, Title VII liability may still be appropriate. The 
court’s determination would mean only that Teamsters systemic 
discrimination analysis would be foreclosed. Individual disparate 
treatment analysis, while potentially buttressed by statistical 
disproportionality, is, unlike systemic discrimination analysis, certainly 
not dependent on it.202 An individual plaintiff unable to rely on statistically 
significant disproportionality would simply need to establish a prima facie 
case of discrimination under facts specific to him. If he is able to marshal 
direct evidence establishing the fact of discrimination, he would establish 
a prima facie case.203 Anything short of an admission of discrimination by 
the decision-maker regarding his employment, however, is unlikely to 
meet this standard.204 Such evidence is, as one would expect in light of 
Charles Lawrence’s revelations regarding subtle and covert discrimination, 
exceedingly rare, and in the absence of such evidence, establishing a prima 
facie case would require a plaintiff to, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
make several showings which would differ slightly based on the plaintiff’s 
status with the team.205  
Assuming the plaintiff has never been a member of the team, sought 
employment with the team through a tryout, and was denied employment 
for allegedly discriminatory reasons, he would have to prove that he was 
qualified for a roster spot the team was seeking to fill, that he was rejected 
despite those qualifications, and that the team continued, after his 
rejection, to seek players to fill the roster spot.206 If the plaintiff had indeed 
been a team member, he would have to show he was qualified for a roster 
202. See Dean C. Berry, The Changing Face of Disparate Impact Analysis, 125 MIL. L. REV. 1, 6–
7 (1989). 
203. See FRIEDMAN & STRICKLER, supra note 192, at 64. 
204. See id. at 64–65. Even a general admission of discrimination in hiring is not likely to
establish a prima facie case. To constitute prima facie evidence, the admission of discrimination must 
regard the particular employment decision at issue. Id. at 65.  
205. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973). 
206. See id.
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spot, was a satisfactory player while on the team, was terminated in spite 
of his qualifications, and the roster spot that was once his remained open 
to other candidates.207 In either context, the plaintiff need not prove he was 
better qualified than the person ultimately hired, and, indeed, some courts 
suggest he need not even prove he was as qualified as the person 
ultimately hired.208 Rather, he must prove he was qualified in that he met 
the position’s minimum criteria.209  
Success in making the prima facie showing would create a presumption 
that the Jazz did, in fact, discriminate against the plaintiff on the basis of 
race in violation of Title VII, leaving the Jazz to either deny the 
discrimination through articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for the decision or acknowledge the discrimination and seek to justify it.210 
The former option would return the burden to the plaintiff to establish the 
proffered reason was either bogus or was only one reason for the decision, 
the other or others of which was or were discriminatory.211 The latter 
option, invocation of Title VII’s bona fide occupational qualification 
(BFOQ) affirmative defense, would, if successful, squelch the inquiry 
altogether and, as such, would appear an attractive alternative. Citing that 
doctrine, the Jazz might well seek shelter from liability through arguing 
that being white is a bona fide occupational qualification of playing 
basketball for the Jazz, a team based in overwhelmingly white Salt Lake 
City and reliant on attracting fans from that population center. Attractive 
as it may be, any such argument would be unavailing. Although the 
doctrine permits an employer to discriminate based on a particular 
characteristic when such discrimination is “reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise,” the doctrine is 
only available to justify discrimination based on gender, religion, or 
national origin; it is not available to justify discrimination based on 
race.212  
While some commentators have argued that discrimination based on 
race should be permitted under the exception in spite of the statutory 
207. See id. 
208. See THOMAS R. HAGGARD, UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 69 (2001).
209. See id.
210. See Susan K. Grebeldinger, How Can a Plaintiff Prove Intentional Employment
Discrimination if She Cannot Explore the Relevant Circumstances: The Need for Broad Workforce 
and Time Parameters in Discovery, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 159, 164–65 (1996). 
211. See id. at 165. 
212. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000). Even in the non-race context, courts are generally
unwilling to accept a BFOQ defense based on customer preference. See infra text accompanying notes 
318–20. 
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language, the great weight of the case law has held otherwise.213 And, 
indeed, Congress clearly felt otherwise, as the omission of race in the 
BFOQ provision was decidedly not accidental.214 In debating the 
substance of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress considered an 
amendment that “would have allowed an employer to hire an individual 
based on race when ‘the employer believes, on the basis of substantial 
evidence, that the hiring of such an individual . . . will be more beneficial 
to the normal operation of the particular business or enterprise involved or 
to the good will thereof than the hiring of an individual without 
consideration of race.’”215 After debate, Congress rejected the 
amendment.216 Ultimately, Congress was concerned that the inclusion of 
race in the BFOQ provision would, in the end, simply “permit 
discrimination on the basis of race or color,” and “would establish a 
loophole that would gut [Title VII].”217  
Without access to the BFOQ defense, the Jazz would almost certainly 
articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision, a far 
easier path in that courts have found the articulation of virtually any lawful 
reason discharges the burden.218 The plaintiff would then ultimately 
prevail if he discharged his burden of persuasion in showing the Jazz’s 
213. See William R. Bryant, Note, Justifiable Discrimination: The Need for a Statutory Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification Defense for Race Discrimination, 33 GA. L. REV. 211, 213–14 (1998). 
Despite the BFOQ provision’s plain language together with the above-discussed legislative history, at 
least one court has indicated the desirability of applying the BFOQ exception in race cases and 
suggested, as an end-around, that a Title VII intentional discrimination defendant might lawfully 
discriminate based on race through application of Title VII’s disparate impact “business necessity” 
doctrine. In Miller v. Texas State Board of Examiners, the Fifth Circuit seemed to endorse the potential 
importation of the “business necessity” doctrine—which permits employers to utilize facially race-
neutral employment requirements, even though they have a disproportionate impact on a particular 
racial group, if the requirements are “related to job performance”—into the Title VII disparate 
treatment context, essentially displacing application of the BFOQ doctrine, which does not permit 
race-based discrimination, with the “business necessity” doctrine, which does. Miller v. Tex. State Bd. 
of Exam’rs, 615 F.2d 650, 653 (5th Cir.1980). To the extent this approach may have opened an avenue 
for a professional sports organization to avoid liability for its rejection of a player on grounds of race, 
Congress closed it with the Civil Rights Act of 1991, declaring that a “demonstration that an 
employment practice is required by business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of 
intentional discrimination . . . .” § 2000e-2(k)(2).  
214. See Bryant, supra note 213, at 215.
215. Id. at 217 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 13,825 (1964)).
216. See Bryant, supra note 213, at 217. 
217. Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 2556 (1964)). 
218. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–68 (1995). The Eleventh Circuit, in Nix v. WLCY
Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187 (11th Cir. 1984), set a standard lower even than 
the extremely low prevailing standard in assessing what constituted a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason for an adverse employment action, finding an “employer may fire an employee for a good 
reason, a bad reason, a reason based on erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as the action is 
not for a discriminatory reason.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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reason for its decision was pretext and that the decision was 
discriminatory, on the one hand, or, on the other hand, in showing the Jazz 
discharged the plaintiff with a mixed motive, which is to say, even if the 
Jazz’s articulated reason contributed to the decision-making process, 
consideration of the plaintiff’s race was also a motivating factor for the 
decision.219 In either case, the plaintiff’s claim would rely largely on the 
circumstances of his particular adverse employment action and would 
almost certainly involve comparison with at least one similarly situated 
white employee or potential employee who received a more favorable 
employment action.220  
For instance, assume the plaintiff is a black 6’9”, 240-pound free agent 
power forward who, during the previous NBA season, averaged eight 
points and three rebounds per game. Assume further the Jazz declined to 
hire him citing as their reasons his stature and statistics. If the plaintiff can 
show that, upon rejecting him, the Jazz hired a white power forward of 
similar stature and similar performance statistics, the plaintiff may well 
carry his ultimate burden of persuasion with regard to the racial 
discrimination claim.221 Of course, if the Jazz’s roster revealed statistically 
significant racial disproportionality, that disproportionality would bolster 
the plaintiff’s claim of intentional individual discrimination, but individual 
analysis of a plaintiff’s circumstances would drive the inquiry, and could 
certainly stand without the statistical showing.222  
219. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101–02
(2003). Notably, Congress has, through the Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 706(g), created limits on the 
relief available to a plaintiff proceeding under a mixed motive theory. If, therefore, a plaintiff pursues 
and prevails under a mixed motive theory, he would be entitled to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, 
and attorneys’ fees and costs, but not to damages, hiring, or reinstatement. See § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).  
220. See Ken Nakasu Davison, Note, The Mixed-Race Experience: Treatment of Racially
Miscategorized Individuals Under Title VII, 12 ASIAN L.J. 161, 166 (2005); Holly A. Williams, Note, 
Reaching Across Difference: Extending Equality’s Reach to Encompass Governmental Programs that 
Solely Benefit Women, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 375, 387 (2005) (“[I]n order to succeed on a claim of 
racial discrimination brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the plaintiff must satisfy 
the similarly situated requirement as part of his or her prima facie case.”).  
221. While such situational similarity and outcome differentiation is indicative of employment
discrimination in both sport and non-sport contexts, the subjectivity traditionally associated with sports 
organizations’ player personnel hiring suggests a successful “evidentiary case” in this context may be 
“tough[er]” than in the non-sport context and may, therefore, require greater situational similarity. 
SHROPSHIRE, supra note 39, at 65.  
222. Even in the absence of both a roster out of proportion with the labor market and individual
circumstances reflective of intentional discrimination, however, Title VII offers the possibility of a 
successful employment discrimination challenge to race-considered roster construction under disparate 
impact theory. Under this approach, plaintiffs would have to establish that a requirement of making the 
team disproportionately impacts black players in a statistically significant way. See Belton, supra note 
9, at 434. Assuming the organization is unable to show the requirement to be a business necessity, or 
that the organization is able to do so, but that the plaintiffs can show a different requirement without 
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It is clear, then, that a roster disproportionately devoid of black players 
is suggestive of racial discrimination, as a legal matter, when the 
disproportionality is statistically significant, and when it is, that 
disproportionality creates an inference of discrimination. Perfect 
proportionality, however, is no prophylactic to liability. An organization 
whose roster is in proportion with the rest of its league may well be found 
liable under Title VII if individual analysis of a particular player’s 
circumstances reveals discrimination. Thus, while intuition inspires Title 
VII scrutiny of teams with disproportionately white rosters, and while that 
disproportionality, if statistically significant, is legally suggestive of racial 
discrimination, any effort to reduce race-considered roster construction in 
professional athletics by focusing attention solely on disproportionality 
would be an inadequately narrow endeavor. A perfectly proportioned team 
may just as readily engage in unlawful race-considered roster construction 
in a particular instance as an out-of-proportion team, and Title VII 
provides a remedy in the former case just as it does in the latter.  
IV. RACE-CONSIDERED ROSTER CONSTRUCTION FAVORING NON-WHITES
AND THE ROLE OF TITLE VII AFFIRMATIVE ACTION JURISPRUDENCE:
CONSIDERING THE CURIOUS CASE OF MINAYA’S METS 
This Article has, heretofore, addressed race-considered roster 
construction in the context of professional sports organizations’ 
employment decisions favoring white players. And, as discussed above, 
race-considered roster construction has historically most often come to 
bear in just that context. It is of course possible, however, that a 
professional sports organization might engage in race-considered roster 
construction favoring non-white players. While Title VII analysis would 
be appropriate in the context of race-considered roster construction under 
such circumstances as it would in the context of roster construction 
favoring white players, Title VII would not necessarily apply in the same 
the racial impact would serve the defendant’s legitimate business interest, the plaintiffs may prevail. 
See Rebecca S. Giltner, Note, Justifying the Disparate Impact Standard Under a Theory of Equal 
Citizenship, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 427, 428 n.4 (2005). Disparate impact challenges, however, are not 
ideally suited for actions challenging race-considered roster construction in professional athletics. 
Impact analysis is appropriate only when a plaintiff can identify a “specific discriminatory hiring 
practice,” such as a particular roster eligibility requirement that disproportionately impacts black 
players; because professional sports organizations tend not to apply identifiable hiring criteria, 
identification of such a criterion can be difficult. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 39, at 65. To the extent, 
however, that a roster eligibility requirement, such as a written test of questionable predictive value, 
disproportionately renders black players ineligible, disparate impact theory might accommodate a 
race-considered roster construction challenge.  
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manner. Just as examination of the 2003–04 Utah Jazz provides a window 
into the analysis driving Title VII scrutiny of race-considered roster 
construction favoring white players, examination of the 2005 New York 
Mets elucidates the extent to which Title VII scrutiny of race-considered 
roster construction favoring non-white players might differ.  
After three disastrous seasons during which the Mets finished with 
win-loss records of 75–86, 66–95, and 71–91, team owner Fred Wilpon, in 
2004, appointed Omar Minaya as the team’s general manager.223 Under 
Minaya, the organization immediately set sights on improving the team’s 
play.224 In addition, the team focused heavily on increasing its appeal to 
the community and, in particular, the Latin community.225 The initiatives 
were several. The team created a radio advertisement featuring renowned 
Latino comedian John Leguizamo phoning Minaya in a desperate pursuit 
of game tickets.226 The team selected Banco Popular, a bank heavily 
patronized by New York’s Latin community, as its sponsoring financial 
institution, and the bank in turn provided free transportation from several 
of New York’s predominantly Latin neighborhoods to Mets games.227 The 
club’s ticket sales office added Spanish-speaking employees.228 And those 
responsible for selling tickets to groups targeted institutions, such as 
churches and schools, in Latin neighborhoods.229 These strategies are non-
violative of Title VII and, indeed, are impressive and commendable 
attempts to provide access to Mets baseball for Latinos and Latinas in 
New York who might otherwise be without. In addition to the 
aforementioned strategies, however, the Mets may have engaged in race-
considered roster construction in creating the 2005 team.  
A. Weber, Johnson, and the Affirmative Action Defense
Importantly, a showing that the Mets considered race in the team’s
player hiring decisions would not necessarily trigger Title VII liability as it 
would were race considered in hiring white players. There has long existed 
a sentiment in employment discrimination jurisprudence that 
discrimination in favor of a member of a traditionally underrepresented 
223. See Jonathan Mahler, Building the Beisbol Brand, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2005, § 6, at 22. 
224. Id.
225. Id. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. 
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group is “not discrimination in a statutory sense,”230 in that such 
discrimination is not the discrimination Title VII was designed to thwart. 
As the Supreme Court explained in the landmark case United Steelworkers 
v. Weber,231 “a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because it is not within its spirit, nor within the intention
of its makers.”232 In that case, the Supreme Court considered Kaiser
Aluminum’s policy of setting aside for black employees half of the
available positions in the company’s craft training program.233 Nearly all
of the company’s craft workers were white, and the company intended to
maintain the policy until such time as its percentage of black craft workers
rose to the analogous percentage in the external labor market.234
The Court upheld the voluntary affirmative action plan as lawful under 
Title VII.235 In doing so, the Court explained that Title VII’s prohibitions 
should be “read against the background of the legislative history of Title 
VII and the historical context from which the Act arose,”236 a context 
indicating the statute’s chief purpose was to protect the employment 
opportunities of minorities.237 As such, the Court established the 
permissibility of affirmative action under Title VII. Several years later, in 
Johnson v. Transportation Agency238 the Court recommitted itself to the 
Weber decision.239 These cases remain good law and continue to guide 
Title VII affirmative action jurisprudence.240 
Notably, the Weber/Johnson standard is restricted in its application to 
the context of evaluating employment decisions made pursuant to an 
employer’s valid affirmative action plan.241 By demanding, in Weber and 
Johnson, that a race-considered employment decision favoring a member 
of an underrepresented population be permissible only within the context 
230. HAGGARD, supra note 208, at 81. 
231. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). 
232. Id. at 201 (quoting Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)). 
233. Id. at 197. 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. at 201. 
237. See id. at 202–03; Michael L. Foreman, Kristin M. Dadey & Audrey J. Wiggins, The 
Continuing Relevance of Race-Conscious Remedies and Programs in Integrating the Nation’s 
Workforce, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 81, 97 (2004); Iheukwumere & Aka, supra note 8, at 23. 
238. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
239. Id. at 627. See Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of
Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1031, 1044 
(2004). Notably, although reaffirming Weber’s reasoning, Johnson held as it did in the sex 
discrimination context, thus expanding Weber’s scope. See id.  
240. See Kenneth R. Davis, Undo Hardship: An Argument for Affirmative Action as a Mandatory
Remedy for Systemic Racial Discrimination Cases, 107 DICK. L. REV. 503, 513 (2003). 
241. See id. at 514. 
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of a valid affirmative action plan, the Court walked the thin line between 
respecting both its acknowledgment in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transportation Co.242 that Title VII protects members of all races, 
including whites, and its realization that discrimination in favor of 
members of underrepresented races may, under certain circumstances, 
effectuate Title VII’s purpose.  
Taken together, Weber and Johnson render permissible race-considered 
employment actions favoring members of traditionally underrepresented 
groups when made pursuant to an affirmative action plan with the purpose 
of eliminating a conspicuous or manifest racial imbalance,243 even if the 
employer’s actions did not cause the imbalance.244 The Court cautioned, 
however, that such a decision is lawful only when it does “not unduly 
trammel the interests of majority group members.”245 And the Court 
offered insight as to when a plan might “trammel interests,” indicating 
interests might be trammeled if a plan required discharge of white workers 
for replacement by black hires, was an “absolute bar” to white employee 
advancement, or was a permanent, rather than a temporary, plan.246 
Notably, neither Weber nor Johnson demands that Title VII affirmative 
action be remedial in nature.247 And, in fact, Johnson hinted toward the 
possible propriety of Title VII affirmative action intended to further non-
remedial purposes.248 The extent to which non-remedial affirmative action 
242. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
243. Sullivan, supra note 239, at 1048. Precisely what constitutes a conspicuous or manifest
imbalance is unclear. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and 
Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 12 (2005); Rebecca Hanner 
White, Affirmative Action in the Workplace: The Significance of Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J. 263, 267 (2003–
2004). The Johnson Court’s approach to determining the existence of an imbalance sufficient to 
support affirmative action involved comparing the percentage of the underrepresented group’s 
members in the relevant position at the organization with the percentage of the underrepresented 
group’s members in the broader workforce with skills necessary to the position. Id. 
244. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 630 (1987); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). 
245. Sullivan, supra note 239, at 1052. See also Robert Belton, Brown as a Work in Progress:
Still Seeking Consensus After All These Years, 34 STETSON L. REV. 487, 494–95 (2005). 
246. Sullivan, supra note 239, at 1052 (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 208). The Weber/Johnson test
is alternatively expressed as a three-pronged test, with the third prong being that the plan not impose 
quotas. See Belton, supra note 244, at 494–95. The two-pronged test views this third prong as the 
simplified conglomeration of the three factors informing whether interests are trammeled. The three-
prong test, on the one hand, and the two-prong test (importing the three-pronged test’s third prong into 
its second prong), on the other, while expressed differently, are functionally the same. 
247. See White, supra note 243, at 274. 
248. See Estlund, supra note 243, at 3. Justice Stevens, in his Johnson concurrence, was
particularly adamant on this point, suggesting that non-remedial justifications for Title VII affirmative 
action be acceptable and that racial diversity might be such a justification. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 646–
47 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
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justifications pass Title VII muster has, however, fallen into some doubt 
over time, largely due to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co.249 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena250 invalidating 
programs in the public contracting realm serving to set aside opportunities 
for minority businesses.251 Neither Croson nor Adarand, of course, has 
direct application to the Title VII affirmative action standard, as both cases 
were decided under the Supreme Court’s parallel constitutional affirmative 
action jurisprudence, which subjects employers charged with equal 
protection violations to strict scrutiny and thus requires the employer’s 
race-consideration to serve a compelling interest and be narrowly 
tailored.252 While the Title VII and constitutional standards are distinct, 
however, the Court’s decisions have revealed a “permeability of the 
doctrinal lines” such that each of the two lines has an atmospheric impact 
on the other.253 Thus, although Croson and Adarand had nothing in 
particular to say about the Weber/Johnson standard, they created 
substantial skepticism as to the availability of non-remedial Title VII 
affirmative action.254  
B. The Grutter Effect: Exploring the Possibility of Diversity as a Rationale
for Title VII Affirmative Action and, Therefore, Affirmative Action-
Inspired Race-Considered Roster Construction
If, however, Croson and Adarand were read to close the possibility of
non-remedial affirmative action under the Weber/Johnson standard, might 
the Supreme Court’s 2003 constitutional affirmative action decision in 
Grutter v. Bollinger255 be read to reestablish that possibility? While some 
scholars have expressed doubt that Grutter will ultimately impact Title VII 
affirmative action,256 analysis suggests it may well.  
249. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
250. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
251. See Estlund, supra note 243, at 3–4, 9. 
252. Belton, supra note 245, at 497 n.11 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)). See
also Belton, supra note 9, at 469; Monique C. Lillard, Deborah C. Malamud, Miranda Oshige 
McGowan, Charles A. Shanor & Robert Belton, The Effect of the University of Michigan Cases on 
Affirmative Action in Employment: Proceedings of the 2004 Annual Meeting, Association of American 
Law Schools, Sections on Employment Discrimination Law, Labor Relations and Employment Law, 
and Minority Groups, 8 EMPL. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 127, 147 (2004) (comments of Prof. Belton) 
[hereinafter AALS 2004 Annual Meeting]. 
253. Estlund, supra note 243, at 13. 
254. See id. at 3–4, 9. 
255. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
256. For a robust discussion concerning the possibility of a diversity interest of any sort justifying
Title VII affirmative action, see AALS 2004 Annual Meeting, supra note 252.  
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In the Grutter case, the Court concluded diversity was a sufficiently 
compelling interest under the constitutional strict scrutiny standard to 
support affirmative action in an institution of higher education’s selection 
of students.257 While Grutter involved the admission of students to an 
educational institution,258 Justice O’Connor’s opinion detailed at length 
the import of diverse perspectives not only in the classroom, but in the 
workplace.259 In reaching its decision, the Court drew support from amicus 
briefs submitted by the armed forces as well as numerous private 
corporations touting the importance of diversity in the workplace, one of 
which declared unequivocally that private companies “need the talent and 
creativity of a workforce that is as diverse as the world around it.”260 On 
the strength of such sentiments, the Court declared affirmative action’s 
“benefits are not theoretical but real, as major American businesses have 
made clear that the skills needed in today’s increasingly global 
marketplace can only be developed through exposure to widely diverse 
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”261  
The Court’s expressed language and its open reliance on the views of 
employers in reaching its decision suggest perhaps the need for diversity is 
as powerful an argument in justifying affirmative action in the 
employment context as it is in the educational context.262 While the 
Supreme Court has yet to examine the constitutionality of an employment-
based affirmative action plan serving a diversity interest rather than a 
remedial interest,263 when it does so, the Grutter opinion itself would 
seemingly provide substantial ammunition for an extension of the Grutter 
rationale into the employment realm under a strict scrutiny constitutional 
analysis.264 Already, in fact, the Seventh Circuit, in Petit v. City of 
Chicago,265 has initiated the expansion of Grutter to the employment 
257. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. See also Foreman, Dadey & Wiggins, supra note 237, at 101. 
258. The Grutter Court restricted the direct effect of its decision to the educational context,
emphasizing the deference to which universities’ decisions are accorded. 539 U.S. at 339. Courts, 
however, have long accorded employer’s decisions substantial deference as well. See White, supra 
note 243, at 270–71. The deference accorded an institution’s decision making would, therefore, present 
no meaningful distinction to a court considering importation of the Grutter rationale into the 
employment context. 
259. 539 U.S. at 330–33. See also Foreman, Dadey & Wiggins, supra note 237, at 102. 
260. Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241 and 02-516).  
261. 539 U.S. at 330.
262. See Foreman, Dadey & Wiggins, supra note 237, at 102; White, supra note 243, at 270. 
263. See Foreman, Dadey & Wiggins, supra note 237, at 101; White, supra note 243, at 264. 
264. Id. (suggesting the Grutter decision should, and will, be central to analysis of employment-
based affirmative action).  
265. 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003).
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context, finding racial diversity of police officers to be a sufficiently 
compelling interest for affirmative action in the employment context under 
the theory that maintaining a diverse force is operationally necessary for 
effective policing.266  
While the establishment of diversity as a compelling interest in the 
employment context under strict scrutiny analysis would certainly not 
establish diversity as a permissible justification for affirmative action 
under the Title VII Weber/Johnson standard,267 the Grutter reasoning 
regarding the value of diversity in employment is certainly no less 
persuasive in the Title VII context than it is in the equal protection 
context.268 As such, the Weber/Johnson standard could conceivably 
experience a broadening to include diversity as a justification for private 
employer affirmative action.269 Professor Cynthia Estlund suggests some 
impact of Grutter on the Title VII affirmative action jurisprudence is 
inescapable. At the least, she suggests, Grutter will have an atmospheric 
effect, which is to say, while it may not necessarily concretely alter the 
Title VII standard, Grutter will influence the background against which 
affirmative action decisions, whether constitutional or Title VII-based, are 
made.270  
266. Id. at 1115. Some question the extent to which Petit portends a broader expansion of the
Grutter rationale to the employment context, as the diversity interest the Chicago Police Department 
has in creating a force to police demographically varied neighborhoods is unique and arguably more 
compelling than the diversity interest articulated by more traditional employers. See AALS 2004 
Annual Meeting, supra note 252, at 140 (comments of Prof. McGowan). In that the Grutter decision 
does not limit its discussion of diversity in employment to diversity in policing organizations, 
however, it would seem the value of diversity, in the Court’s view, may well resonate beyond the Petit 
context.  
267. If, of course, a professional sports organization is deemed a public employer and its hiring
decisions are challenged under constitutional strict scrutiny analysis, the organization could argue that 
Grutter’s education-oriented diversity rationale justifies the organization’s employment-based 
affirmative action plan without needing to reference Title VII affirmative action jurisprudence. 
Establishing a professional sports organization’s engagement in state action, however, would likely be 
a difficult task, and any action regarding such an organization’s hiring practices is, therefore, likely to 
contemplate the organization as a private employer. See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 39, at 73. 
268. See Foreman, Dadey & Wiggins, supra note 237, at 103. 
269. See Estlund, supra note 243, at 35–38.
270. Id. at 36. 
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The impact, however, may be significantly more direct.271 Any such 
shift in the law would rely on an analysis of the ends served by Grutter’s 
diversity interest in the educational context and the extent to which those 
ends might appropriately be served in the employment context. The Court 
in Grutter recognized that diversity at the University of Michigan’s Law 
School contributed positively both to the Law School’s mission of 
educating students and to the well-being of American society more 
broadly.272 Indeed, “there was no dichotomy in Grutter between the 
pursuit of the greater social good and the pursuit of institutional 
objectives.”273 In other words, diversity serves the institution’s mission of 
providing what the institution views as a strong education while at the 
same time preparing students to contribute meaningfully as members of 
society.274 It thus serves both a “business” purpose and a “civic” 
purpose.275  
In that private employers do not generally exist to prepare their 
employees for positive societal contribution or to discharge civic duties, 
Grutter’s “civic case” for diversity—the argument that the “cross-racial 
empathy” inuring to students educated in a diverse setting will benefit 
society when the students leave school—would seemingly not apply in the 
employment context.276 As Professor Estlund explains, “[t]he civic 
contribution of workplace interactions among diverse workers, though 
powerful, is entirely incidental to the primary organizational 
objectives.”277 The institutional or “business case for diversity”—the 
argument that diversity is central, not incidental, to the organization’s 
primary objectives278—would, however, more intuitively apply in the 
employment realm. And considering the extent to which the Grutter 
271. Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the extent to which a diversity rationale
justifies Title VII race-conscious decision making, it was poised to do so after the Third Circuit 
rejected such a rationale in Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
banc). In that case, the board of education was faced with laying off one of two teachers who were 
equally qualified. 91 F.3d at 1551. One of the teachers was black, and indeed the only black teacher in 
her department, and the other was white. Id. Pursuant to an affirmative action plan, the board laid off 
the white teacher so as to maintain its diversity. Id. The discharged teacher asserted a Title VII 
challenge against the board, and prevailed in both the district court and on appeal in the Third Circuit. 
Id. at 1552. The board appealed, but before the Supreme Court heard the case, the parties settled the 
matter and the case was dismissed. See Foreman, Dadey & Wiggins, supra note 237, at 98.  
272. See Estlund, supra note 243, at 27.
273. Id. 
274. See id. at 26–27. 
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 27. 
278. Id. at 21–22. 
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decision emphasized the importance of diversity in the private 
workplace—a workplace governed by Title VII rather than constitutional 
jurisprudence—a business case for diversity would seem a promising 
justification for Title VII affirmative action. Precisely what business 
purpose that diversity serves, however, would likely bear heavily on its 
acceptability as a justification in the Title VII context. 
One business purpose diversity might serve is what Professor Estlund 
calls “external legitimacy” and describes as appearing legitimate and 
credible to “external constituencies” such as “clientele.”279 As Professor 
Estlund points out, such a rationale for diversity would seemingly run 
afoul of Title VII’s long-standing refusal280 to permit companies to reflect 
customer preference through considering race in selecting employees.281 
Without question, the affirmative action realm provides an entirely 
different context than the majority-controlled decision-making process 
seeking white homogeneity which gave rise to Title VII and the 
prohibition on customer-reflected employment composition. Still, as 
Professor Estlund notes, “to the extent [the external legitimacy argument 
necessarily] invokes the preferences of those with market power for 
dealing with ‘their own kind,’ it echoes employers’ discredited efforts to 
cite discriminatory ‘customer preferences’ as justification for their own 
discrimination. While workforce-wide diversity programs are a far cry 
from the exclusionary hiring practice that Title VII targeted, the echo is 
still an eerie one.”282 The eerie echo Estlund describes would certainly 
seem to render the prospect of courts adopting an external legitimacy 
business rationale for Title VII affirmative action unlikely.  
Perhaps the echo is so eerie, however, because the external legitimacy 
rationale conjures, at first blush, scenarios such as the one Professor 
Rebecca White explores in expressing doubt as to the success of an 
external legitimacy affirmative action argument. Professor White 
considers a hypothetical car dealership’s attempt to diversify its sales force 
to increase profitability and concludes any argument that the dealership 
“could sell more cars with a racially diverse workforce than with a more 
racially homogeneous one is unlikely to convince a court that the 
279. Id. at 22.
280. This is explicated most clearly in the BFOQ context. See id. at 23 n.111. 
281. See id. at 23. 
282. Id. (quoting AALS 2004 Annual Meeting, supra note 252, at 133 (Comments of Prof.
Malamud)). 
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employer is entitled under the statute to prefer [salespeople] of one race 
over another . . . .”283  
The echo would not appear as eerie in the context, for example, of a 
not-for-profit, nongovernmental community organization seeking to hire 
staff members to direct a program designed to inspire academic excellence 
among youth of color living in an under-resourced community and to 
prepare them for eventual employment. Indeed, the community 
organization’s reliance on an external legitimacy rationale for seeking to 
hire some staff members of color—namely that the youth would more 
readily identify with and accept counsel from staff of color—would seem 
more akin to the rationale the Seventh Circuit approved in Petit v. City of 
Chicago,284 discussed above, than the rationale of the car dealership in 
Professor White’s hypothetical. Through the hires the organization would 
be seeking to appear legitimate to its “external constituencies”—the youth 
it counsels—not in order to market and sell products, but to further Title 
VII’s purpose of improving the economic lot of members of traditionally 
disadvantaged populations.285 Under these circumstances, an external 
legitimacy argument does not “invoke[] the preferences of those with 
market power for dealing with ‘their own kind,’”286 rather it invokes the 
spirit of Title VII and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It does not offend Title 
VII’s heritage; it relies upon it. It would seem, then, the desire for external 
legitimacy, when that legitimacy is sought so as to further Title VII’s 
purposes, may well gain traction under Title VII jurisprudence in the event 
of a Grutter-inspired expansion.287  
Even assuming the viability of such an external legitimacy argument, 
the argument would be inaccessible to scores of private employers who 
seek external legitimacy for reasons other than furthering Title VII’s 
purposes, and would thus have only limited application in the private 
workforce. Organizations unable to rely on an external legitimacy business 
283. White, supra note 243, at 277. 
284. Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1110, 1115 (7th Cir. 2003).
285. The success of such an external legitimacy argument would rest, in part, on the premise that
staff members’ race is necessarily relevant to the organization’s success in pursuing its mission. While 
the validity of this premise is debatable, such a premise has received some support in the law. See id. 
at 1113 (finding diversity to be operationally necessary to patrolling and protecting a diverse city); 
Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919–20 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding diversity to be operationally necessary 
in the corrections context).  
286. Estlund, supra note 243, at 23 (quoting AALS 2004 Annual Meeting, supra note 252, at 133
(Comments of Prof. Malamud)). 
287. Professor White seems to acknowledge the prospect of a “diversity-based approach to
affirmative action” being acceptable under Title VII in situations such as these—situations, as she puts 
it, “in which the employer’s interest could be viewed as compelling within the meaning of strict 
scrutiny . . . .” White, supra note 243, at 278.  
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case for affirmative action would, however, potentially have access to a 
second type of business justification for diversity—an internally focused 
rationale.288 An internally focused rationale for diversity recognizes that an 
organization may desire diversity not because it attracts customers or 
increases organizational credibility, but because, as a separate matter, it 
improves the product.289 It might do so in two ways. First, organizational 
diversity tends to broaden the range of approaches taken in creating 
strategy or considering alternatives,290 potentially resulting in more 
thoroughly vetted and effective decisions and actions. Second, assuming 
an organization is not entirely homogenous, meaning there exists at the 
least a minimal non-white presence, increased diversity “may yield better 
group effectiveness” than a scenario under which the minimal non-white 
presence might be isolated, marginalized, and thus perhaps hampered in 
contributing fully to the organization.291 Through diversity, the argument 
goes, the organization strengthens itself and creates a better product.  
In recognizing the weakness of the hypothetical car dealership’s 
affirmative action argument, Professor White suggests that while it is 
possible a profit-seeking organization might justifiably implement 
affirmative action, in doing so it would have to rely on “something other” 
than a pure profit rationale.292 Perhaps the “something other” is the 
improved workplace dynamic the internally focused business case for 
diversity seeks. The internally focused case seeks an improved decision-
making process as well as greater group cohesion and productivity in 
288. The internally focused business case for diversity combines elements of Professor Estlund’s
“internal improved decision making” case for diversity with elements of her discussion of the 
circumstances under which diversity benefits more general intangible group efficacy. See Estlund, 
supra note 243, at 21–25.  
289. See generally Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, supra note 260. 
290. See Estlund, supra note 243, at 21. Estlund notes that diversity may also have negative
consequences, including an increase in friction among employees, but that employers who learn to 
effectively “manage diversity,” may “counteract” those negative consequences and yield overall 
improved performance. Id. at 22.  
291. Id. at 25. Black centerfielder Ellis Burks’s tenure with the Boston Red Sox provides a
powerful example in this regard. Burks, who joined the Red Sox in 1987, was the team’s only black 
player during two of his years on the roster. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 154. Burks was a gifted 
athlete and a talented baseball player, and was predicted to be “the next great Red Sox outfielder.” Id. 
at 179, 186, 133. Although Burks’s early career in Boston was promising, including a 1989 All-Star 
season, Burks felt racially isolated and lonely playing for the Red Sox, was ultimately unable to play to 
his potential, and was released after the 1992 season. See id. at 133, 200. Burks joined the racially 
diverse Chicago White Sox for the 1993 season, and “[i]mmediately, baseball was fun again.” Id. at 
202. Burks resurrected his career in Chicago and later joined the Colorado Rockies where he achieved
his potential, posting a .340 batting average, hitting 40 home runs, and placing second in voting for the
National League’s Most Valuable Player award. See id. at 203.
292. White, supra note 243, at 277.
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addition to, and as a basis for, improved business and increased profit; it 
is, indeed, grounded in “something other” than a pure profit rationale. 
Considering (1) Weber’s pronouncement that discrimination in favor of 
a member of a traditionally underrepresented group is not statutory 
discrimination, (2) Weber and Johnson’s refusal to rule out nonremedial 
purposes for Title VII affirmative action plans, (3) Grutter’s establishment 
of diversity as justifying affirmative action in the educational context, (4) 
Grutter’s strong suggestion that diversity would justify affirmative action 
in the employment context, and (5) the “permeability of the doctrinal 
lines” bounding Title VII and constitutional affirmative action 
jurisprudence,293 perhaps that “something other” is just enough to prompt 
open a previously closed door to diversity-based Title VII affirmative 
action.  
Of course, whether Title VII affirmative action jurisprudence will 
experience a Grutter-inspired expansion is subject to speculation. If it 
does, a professional sports organization, such as the Mets, could lawfully 
make a race-considered decision to hire a non-white player if pursuant to 
an affirmative action plan justified by either intent to remedy a 
conspicuous racial imbalance, as discussed above, or intent to increase 
diversity.  
C. Might Weber, Johnson, or Even Grutter Play for the Mets?
Recognizing the potential permissibility of the Mets’ hiring prior to the
2005 season, it becomes necessary to further explore whether the hiring 
was, in fact, race-considered, and, if so, whether the Mets may seek shelter 
under affirmative action jurisprudence.  
1. The Martinez Acquisition
As the Mets prepared for their 2005 season, they pursued, among other 
players, Pedro Martinez, Carlos Beltran, Miguel Cairo, and Carlos 
Delgado, all Latino, ultimately hiring the first three.294 While much was 
made of the signings in the press, with some labeling the team “Los Mets” 
293. Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in
the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 12 (2005). 
294. See Mahler, supra note 222, at 22. Although the Mets failed to sign Delgado as the 2005
season approached, they continued to pursue him and finally succeeded in trading for him after the 
conclusion of that season. See Ben Shpigel, Delgado, Check. Next for Mets? Wagner, Check., N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at D1. 
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in reference to their burgeoning Latino presence,295 pursuing four Latino 
players and signing three in a league in which nearly 25% of all players 
are Latino296 is not particularly notable. A New York Times Magazine 
feature story on the 2005 Mets, the Mets’ hiring of Martinez, and the 
process through which the club decided to hire him, is, however, notable 
and, ultimately, instructive.  
In December 2004, the Mets were seeking to hire a new starting pitcher 
to strengthen the team’s pitching rotation.297 Among the pitchers 
considered were Pedro Martinez, a Latino player, who pitched the 
previous year with the Boston Red Sox, and Matt Clement, a white player, 
who pitched the previous year with the Chicago Cubs.298 There apparently 
existed disagreement in the organization as to which pitcher to hire.299 
Martinez, one of the great pitchers of his generation and one of MLB’s 
most prominent and beloved Latino players, was obviously a strong 
candidate.300 Clement, although far less experienced and renowned, was a 
strong candidate as well.301 There was no debate that in 2005 Martinez 
would be the better pitcher, but the Mets’ statistical analyst, Ben Baumer, 
argued Clement might possibly be the better performer for the money over 
the course of a four-year career.302 Baumer suggested Martinez was 
declining as a pitcher while Clement was improving.303 Apparently, 
Martinez’s rate, in 2004, of issuing bases on balls to batters was increasing 
at the same time as his strikeout rate was decreasing.304 And although 
Clement had less control of his pitches than Martinez, his strikeout rate in 
2004 was better than Martinez’s, and he was more successful than 
Martinez at preventing batters’ base hits.305  
295. Mahler, supra note 223, at 22; Ricardo Zuniga, Minaya’s Heritage Helping Mets, ALB. 
TIMES UNION, Jan. 20, 2005, at C1; Chris Smith, Los Mets: How Omar Minaya Ensnared Players Like 
Pedro Martinez and Carlos Beltran to Create a New Latin Dream Team. Now, Can They Win Any 
Games?, NEW YORK METRO.COM, http://www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/sports/features/ 
11260. 
296. See MLB.com, Major League Baseball and Chevrolet Unveil Program Celebrating the
Greatest Latino Players in the History of the Game, http://www.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/news/press_ 
releases/press_release.jsp?ymd=20050823&content_id=1180675&vkey=pr_mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb 
(last visited May 12, 2006). 
297. See Mahler, supra note 223, § 6, at 22.
298. Id. 
299. Id. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. 
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The Mets ultimately hired Martinez.306 Under any number of factual 
scenarios, the hiring decision would be unworthy of note and certainly 
beyond the scope of Title VII application. If, after the Mets’ front office 
personnel debated the merits of the pitchers, they simply concluded 
Martinez would be a better pitcher over the course of four years, no Title 
VII analysis would be in order. And no Title VII analysis would be in 
order if they concluded Clement would be the better pitcher over the 
course of four years, but they believed Martinez would be the better 
pitcher during the 2005 season and they valued immediate contribution. 
Similarly, if the Mets concluded Martinez and Clement would be 
equivalent acquisitions from a pitching talent perspective, but hired 
Martinez because they felt he was a stronger leader, a more loyal 
teammate, or possessed some other attribute Clement lacked, their 
decision would be in compliance with Title VII. Indeed, even if the Mets 
hired Martinez because they believed his extraordinary past performances 
and national reputation would attract fans, Title VII would not come to 
bear. Title VII scrutiny would, however, be appropriate if the Mets hired 
Martinez because he was Latino—even if they hired him also because of 
his talent and fame—in the belief that his being Latino would attract 
fans.307 Apparently, this final scenario is the scenario that played out. 
After the aforementioned internal analysis as to which pitcher to hire 
and the Mets’s decision to hire Martinez, the Mets’ general manager, 
Minaya, indicated publicly that the Mets considered race in hiring 
Martinez. Indeed, in making the hire, Minaya’s “hope was that Martinez 
would bring fans—especially Latin fans—out to Shea [Stadium, the Mets’ 
home field] and raise the team’s profile in the Dominican Republic.”308 As 
such, even considering Martinez’s immense skill, Minaya acknowledged 
“Pedro was as much a marketing signing as a baseball signing.”309 As a 
marketing matter, the personnel move was genius. When Martinez pitched 
his first game as a Met on Saturday, April 16, 2005, the Mets hosted more 
fans for a Saturday game than ever before in the team’s forty-four year 
existence.310 As a legal matter, the personnel move demands examination. 
If the Mets’s hiring practices were challenged as systematically 
discriminatory against white players, the Mets could, of course, potentially 
argue the lawfulness of their hiring under affirmative action doctrine. As 
306. Id. 
307. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
308. Mahler, supra note 222, at 622. 
309. Id.
310. See id.
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noted above, if the Martinez hire and other hires were made pursuant to an 
affirmative action plan intended to remedy a conspicuous racial imbalance 
on the roster, and did not trammel the interests of white players, no Title 
VII liability would attach. The argument would, however, likely be 
unavailing. While the Mets may have, indeed, acted pursuant to an 
affirmative action plan, their public indications of Martinez’s race being 
important to their hiring decision with no reference to an affirmative 
action plan, suggest they did not.  
Even if they acted pursuant to an affirmative action plan, to be valid, as 
addressed above, that plan would, under current law, have to intend 
remediation of a conspicuous racial imbalance. The Mets’ comments in 
the public record, however, do not bear on racial imbalance or the 
remediation thereof, and without a showing of intent to remedy a 
conspicuous racial imbalance, any affirmative action defense would be 
lacking under the Weber/Johnson standard. To the extent, however, that 
Grutter has ripened Title VII affirmative action doctrine for expansion, the 
Mets would potentially be spared the requirement of such a showing, and 
would instead need to show their intent to increase diversity. And while 
there exists no evidence of any conspicuous racial imbalance or any intent 
by the Mets to remediate such an imbalance, the Mets have indicated a 
public commitment to diversifying their roster. While Minaya has 
acknowledged pursuing Martinez in part because he is Latino,311 Minaya’s 
broader articulated intent was to “field[] a club that reflects [New York’s] 
diversity . . . .”312  
Under a Grutter-influenced Title VII affirmative action regime, the 
manner in which the Mets pursued such diversity would play a 
fundamental role in any court’s inquiry. For instance, a plan under which 
the Mets considered a potential player’s race, as one among many factors, 
with a goal of building a team that is diverse in a city that is diverse, but 
with no firm numerical targets, would attract less suspicion than a plan 
aimed at mirroring New York’s demographic composition.313 The latter 
plan would almost certainly be viewed as dangerously analogous to an 
unlawful quota system, while the former, more flexible, plan would likely 
avoid that fatal characterization.314  
Under either plan, however, an intent to reflect New York’s diversity—
whether generally or in precise terms—would appear to rely on an external 
311. See id. 
312. Smith, supra note 295.
313. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335–36. 
314. See id. 
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legitimacy rationale for diversity, the type of diversity rationale which, as 
detailed above, would likely have limited application in the private sector. 
To the extent the Mets considered race in its player hiring to attract more 
Latin fans to Shea Stadium for Mets games, as Minaya suggested, their 
decision would seem quite like Professor White’s hypothetical car 
dealership’s unlawful consideration of race in its hiring to increase car 
sales. Assuming arguendo, however, the Mets considered race in hiring in 
part to provide role models and inspiration for members of a traditionally 
disadvantaged population, their consideration of race would seem more 
analogous to the hypothetical community center’s hiring and, thus, to 
circumstances potentially justifying affirmative action treatment under a 
Grutter-influenced Title VII jurisprudence.315 In the alternative, Grutter-
influenced Title VII jurisprudence might support the Mets’ consideration 
of race in hiring decisions if made pursuant to an internally focused 
affirmative action rationale. If unable to show they operated under one of 
these two theories, the Mets, even under a Grutter-influenced Title VII 
regime, would likely be unable to take shelter under affirmative action’s 
umbrella, and would be susceptible to a paradigmatic Title VII challenge. 
2. Can the Mets Win with Weber, Johnson, and Grutter on the
Sidelines?
Absent support from affirmative action doctrine, the Mets would have 
difficulty parrying a Title VII challenge. Consider the facts, as established 
in the public record, regarding the Martinez hire. Assuming, as those facts 
suggest, the Mets hired Martinez rather than Clement, at least in part, 
because Martinez is Latino, and they did so in the absence of a valid 
affirmative action plan, Clement may be able to present a court with the 
rarest of evidence—direct evidence of discrimination sufficient to 
immediately shift the burden to the Mets to articulate a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the hiring decision.316  
315. Although the Supreme Court rejected a similar “role model” theory in deciding Wygant v.
Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), it did so out of concern the theory would permit race-
conscious employment decisions “long past the point required by any legitimate remedial purpose,” id. 
at 275. A Grutter-influenced Title VII jurisprudence, however, would demand no remedial purpose, 
but rather a diversity purpose. See supra Part IV.C. Consequently, such an argument, post-Grutter, 
might well breathe new life.  
316. See Sullivan, supra note 239, at 1057. If Clement were required to establish a prima facie
case, his claim would implicate an extremely murky realm of employment discrimination law, namely, 
the extent to which the McDonnell Douglas prima facie test applies when a white plaintiff claims 
discrimination. Sullivan explains, “[w]here a white plaintiff challenges an employment decision 
against the typical white-dominated employer, it is more difficult to draw the inference that the 
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The Mets would almost certainly respond that they hired Martinez 
because he is an outstanding pitcher. In that Martinez is undoubtedly an 
outstanding pitcher, Clement would likely not seek to establish pretext, but 
would instead argue that the Mets proceeded in hiring Martinez with a 
mixed motive—both because he is an outstanding pitcher and because he 
is Latino. In doing so, Clement would need to show only that Martinez’s 
being Latino was a motivating factor, not the sole factor, of the Mets’ 
hire.317 Again, if the Mets’ public statements are accurate, Clement would 
almost certainly make this showing and ultimately prevail. 
Notably, the Mets in responding to Clement’s direct evidence of 
discrimination would have an option other than articulating a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for their decision. While the Mets could not seek 
to invoke the BFOQ exception in justifying a race-considered decision to 
select Martinez over Clement, they could seek BFOQ protection if they 
framed the decision to hire the Dominican-born Martinez as resulting from 
national-origin consideration rather than race consideration.318 Although 
this would be a statutorily sanctioned approach, the BFOQ exception is 
extraordinarily narrow,319 and unlikely to support the Mets’ hire.  
To prevail, the Mets would have to show both that hiring a Dominican 
national is “essential” to the Mets’ business and that being a Dominican 
makes Martinez a good pitcher.320 Even if the Mets were able to show that 
being of a particular nationality means being a better baseball player, a 
doubtful proposition to be sure, any attempt to frame the “essence” of the 
Mets’ business as increasing revenue through appealing to a fan base and 
hiring a Dominican national as necessary to that end would fail. The courts 
have “steadfastly refused to permit employers to define the essence of 
employer acted because of discrimination against whites, even where the most common, legitimate 
reasons for the decisions are negated” and consequently some courts require such a plaintiff to 
“present evidence of ‘background circumstances’ that establish that the defendant ‘is that unusual 
employer who discriminates against the majority.’” Id. at 1059–63 (quoting Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 
F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1999)). Among courts that apply a “background circumstances” test, there
appears little uniformity in the manner of its application, rendering the prima facie inquiry somewhat
unpredictable. See Sullivan, supra note 239, at 1065–71, 1059 n.20.
317. See id. at 1122–23. 
318. Title VII § 703(e)(1) permits national origin discrimination when national origin is a bona
fide occupational qualification. See Paul Frymer & John D. Skrentny, The Rise of Instrumental 
Affirmative Action: Law and the New Significance of Race in America, 36 CONN. L. REV. 677, 697 
(2004) (describing the law’s treatment of “Latino” as both a racial category and, for purposes of BFOQ 
analysis, a national origin category, but warning that a regime permitting BFOQ application with 
regard to a group generally categorized as a racial group, such as Latinos, but not with regard to 
another racial group, such as blacks, would create an anomalous and unsatisfactory result).  
319. LEWIS & NORMAN, supra note 192, at 174. 
320. See id. at 176–77. 
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their business as maximizing profit, because then customer preference—
often the embodiment of the very kind of accumulated prejudice or 
stereotype Title VII seeks to overcome—could be invoked to justify a vast 
range of absolute exclusions . . . .”321 Thus, even with a national origin-
based, rather than a race-based, argument for BFOQ protection, the Mets 
would be unable to rely on the BFOQ exception, and would be susceptible 
to Title VII liability.  
D. When the Consequences Don’t Flow: How Affirmative Action-Inspired
Race-Considered Roster Construction Avoids Inspiring Race-Based
Team Identification
While the Mets organization, under the facts in the public record, may
be an unlikely candidate for affirmative action protection regarding its pre-
2005 season hiring, the Mets’ or any other team’s race-considered decision 
to hire non-white players, under different circumstances, might well avoid 
Title VII liability.322 The possibility of lawful race-considered roster 
321. Id. at 175 (emphasis added). 
322. Recognizing that Title VII permits race-considered roster construction pursuant to a valid
affirmative action plan—whether justified by an intent to remedy a conspicuous imbalance or, perhaps, 
a business diversity rationale—it is possible a professional sports organization with a primarily non-
white roster might seek to lawfully engage in race-considered roster construction in hiring a white 
player. In doing so, the organization would argue that hiring a white player to join a primarily non-
white team would remedy a conspicuous imbalance or diversify the roster. 
 While a novel argument, it is unlikely to succeed. Recall the jumping-off point for the Supreme 
Court’s Title VII affirmative action jurisprudence in Weber. Faced with a case in which a company, 
Kaiser Aluminum, engaged in race-conscious decision-making to ensure opportunities for its black 
employees, the Court concluded that the company had not discriminated under the statute. See United 
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208–09 (1979). And it concluded as such because Title 
VII was “triggered by [America’s] concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to improve 
the lot of those who had ‘been excluded from the American dream for so long’ . . . .” Id. at 204 
(internal citation omitted). To hold that a company discriminated under the statute when the 
company’s intent was to fulfill the statute’s purpose through securing opportunities for blacks would 
be, as the Court put it, “ironic indeed.” Id. So, Title VII affirmative action jurisprudence exists because 
such race-considered decision making, when pursuant to a justifiable rationale, is not discrimination 
and thus not actionable under Title VII. A race-considered decision to hire a white player, would not, 
under this formulation, fall outside the definition of discrimination under the statute. The decision 
would be statutory discrimination, would not, therefore, trigger Weber/Johnson affirmative action 
analysis, and would, as a consequence, be actionable. Put simply, Weber and Johnson create an 
exception to the McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. rule that an employer cannot 
discriminate against a non-white in favor of a white, and the exception exists, according to the Court, 
for purposes of effectuating Title VII’s core intent. There exists no analogous exception to the general 
rule that an employer cannot discriminate against a white in favor of a non-white, meaning any race-
considered plan intended to increase numbers of white team members would likely be untenable under 
Title VII.  
 Despite Title VII’s legislative history and the rationale undergirding the Weber decision, an 
argument might be made that if, despite its history and purpose, Title VII provides a cause of action 
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construction, of course, forces inquiry into whether such roster 
construction might, just like unlawful race-considered roster construction, 
spur race-based team identification, the consequent transmogrification of 
athletic confrontation into racial confrontation, and the racial violence that 
potentially flows therefrom. The inquiry, however, is easily answered in 
the negative. Because race-considered roster construction serving to 
remedy racial imbalance brings a roster into greater balance, it discourages 
race-based team identification rather than encouraging it, suggesting this 
exception to Title VII’s prohibition on race-considered roster construction 
would not yield the negative societal outcomes associated with race-
considered roster construction outside the affirmative action context.  
Consider, for instance, the Boston Red Sox of 1983, a team on which 
Jim Rice was the only black player and had been the only black player 
during the three preceding years.323 If that organization engaged in race-
considered roster construction pursuant to a plan intended to remedy its 
conspicuous racial imbalance, it would become less of a “white” team and 
thus reduce the prospect of race-based team identification and the resultant 
negative externalities. Once the conspicuous racial imbalance ceased to 
exist, there would be no conspicuous imbalance to remedy, and the 
affirmative action propelled race-considered roster construction would, by 
necessity of law, stop. There is, thus, no danger the race-considered roster 
construction would transform an entirely “white” team into an entirely 
“non-white” team and so recreate the race-based identification concern 
with a different demographic identifying with the team on racial grounds.  
The same would be true under a diversity rationale for affirmative 
action. Once the organization employs a critical mass of the 
underrepresented group, the plan would no longer justify race-considered 
decisionmaking.324 As with employment decisions made pursuant to an 
under some circumstances to white plaintiffs, perhaps Title VII can be read to permit race-considered 
hiring in favor of white applicants under certain circumstances, such as when a company seeks to 
remedy a conspicuous racial imbalance in which whites comprise the conspicuous minority, and this 
argument would spawn counter-arguments. See Frymer & Skrentny, supra note 318, at 721–23 
(considering the prospect of affirmative action benefiting “WASP males” and expressing caution with 
regard to that prospect in, at least, the remedial context, suggesting “[i]t is quite arguable that when 
affirmative action is understood in the historical / remedial model, it is most appropriately limited in 
use for African-Americans and other groups in society that have experienced systematic and severe 
forms of discrimination sponsored by the national government”). The feasibility, policy implications, 
and societal impact of expanding the Title VII affirmative action doctrine to embrace race-considered 
hiring in favor of white applicants merits investigation, but such investigation is beyond the scope of 
this article.  
323. See BRYANT, supra note 41, at 139. 
324. Estlund, supra note 243, at 18. Because the Grutter Court did not precisely define what
constitutes a “critical mass” in the strict scrutiny context, the precise contours of “critical mass” in the 
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affirmative action plan serving to ameliorate a conspicuous racial 
imbalance, therefore, such decisions made pursuant to an affirmative 
action plan serving to increase diversity would not run the danger of 
sparking race-based team identification.  
Ultimately, then, the Weber/Johnson affirmative action doctrine bars 
Title VII’s general prohibition on race-considered roster construction 
when it serves to effectuate Title VII’s core purpose of improving the 
economic lot of traditionally disadvantaged populations. Employment 
decisions made in furtherance of an affirmative action plan designed to 
remedy an organization’s conspicuous racial imbalance would certainly 
qualify for Weber/Johnson protection and, if Title VII experiences 
Grutter-influenced expansion, so too would decisions in furtherance of an 
affirmative action plan aimed at increasing diversity. In neither case, 
however, would race-considered roster construction threaten to inspire the 
race-based team identification associated with non-affirmative action race-
considered roster construction, because in the affirmative action context, 
the race-considered decision would seek to increase, rather than decrease, 
racial balance.  
CONCLUSION 
Since 1964, Title VII has prohibited racial discrimination on the part of 
employers throughout the country, and the statute regulates professional 
sports organizations just as it regulates other employers. All unlawful 
employment discrimination, regardless of the employer’s industry, yields 
negative consequences Title VII exists to prevent. Due to the professional 
sports industry’s unique character, however, employment discrimination in 
the form of unlawful non-affirmative action race-considered roster 
construction yields unique consequences. Professional sports 
organizations, unlike other employers, have fans who identify with the 
organizations and support the organizations’ competitive endeavors, and, 
consequently, unlawful race-considered roster construction risks sparking 
race-based team identification, as it did at UMass in the aftermath of the 
1986 World Series. Title VII, if applied to thwart unlawful race-considered 
roster construction, has the power to prevent these unique consequences.  
While there exists no tradition of professional athletes mounting Title 
VII challenges against professional sports organizations, this is not 
consequent to an absence of viable claims. Unlawful race-considered 
Title VII affirmative action context are subject to speculation. Id. 
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roster construction has endured as a reality in American professional sport 
for decades, and if unchecked, there is no cause to believe it will cease. 
Title VII provides the check; professional athletes suffering discriminatory 
roster exclusion need only utilize it. In doing so, they would be protecting 
themselves from unlawful race-considered roster construction and 
protecting broader society from such discrimination’s unsavory 
consequences. 
